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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL IN
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan*
Pratheepan Gulasekaram**
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a systematic, empirical investigation of the genesis
of state and local immigration regulations, discrediting the popular notion
that they are caused by uneven demographic pressures across the country. It
also proffers a novel theory to explain the proliferation of these policies and
queries the implications of this new model for federalism analysis. The
story we tell in this paper is both political and legal; understanding
immigration politics uncovers vital truths about the recent rise of
subnational involvement in a policy arena that courts and commentators
have traditionally ascribed to the federal government. Thus, this article
connects the proliferation of state and local regulation with the extraconstitutional political institutions and key policy actors who prominently
influence both federal and subfederal immigration lawmaking but who
remain obscured in traditional, apolitical accounts. This recognition of the
political dynamics of immigration law, we argue, fundamentally alters
judicial, scholarly, and public evaluations of immigration federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
According to elected officials and policy advocates, the United States is
undergoing a period of unprecedented demographic change, with
unauthorized immigrants flooding in and causing cultural and economic
upheaval in states and localities unaccustomed to such transformations or
overly burdened by an accelerated rate of change. 1 For example, Lou
Bartletta, mayor of a small city in central Pennsylvania that was among the
earliest to pass a restrictive ordinance, testified to Congress that “[i]n
Hazleton, illegal immigration is not some abstract debate about walls and
amnesty, but it is a tangible, very real problem.”2 State and local
immigration laws emerge as compelled solutions to these newfound and
intractable policy challenges.3 Indicative of this trend are the muchpublicized enactments over the past five years in localities such as
Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Spring Valley, Missouri; Farmer’s Branch, Texas;
Escondido, California; and in states such as Arizona, Alabama, Georgia,
and Mississippi.4 These jurisdictions are ostensibly responding to policy
1.
In this paper, we will mostly refer to the class of persons of unauthorized immigrants,
except when referring to the statements or actions of restrictionist actors who use the terms
“illegal aliens” or “illegal immigrants.” Any reference to these persons is intended to mean a
group that either entered without inspection or are otherwise out of status and unlawfully
present in the United States.
2.
See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Examining the Need for a Guest
Worker Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11–13 (2006)
(statement of Hon. Louis Barletta, Mayor, Hazleton, Pennsylvania).
3.
See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, Ordinance 2006-18
(Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton_second
ordinance.pdf. The subsequent litigation challenging the ordinance, however, resulted in
enjoinment of the law. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S.
Ct. 2958 (2011). The U.S. Supreme Court forestalled a final decision on the case by remanding
it to the federal appellate court for consideration in light of the Court’s recent decision in
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). See City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano,
131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). In Whiting, the Court upheld an Arizona law requiring businesses in the
state to verify the legal status of their employees. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985–86.
4.
H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2010), enjoined in part by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); H.B. 87, 151st
Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2011); H.B. 488, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012); Escondido, Cal.,
Ordinance No. 2006-38 R (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
immigrants/escondido_ordinance.pdf, enjoined by Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d
1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Valley Park, Mo., An Ordinance Relating to Illegal Immigration Within
the City of Valley Park, MO, Ordinance 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark_ordinance.pdf; Riverside, N.J., Illegal Immigration Relief Act,
Ordinance 2006–16 (July 26, 2006); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006),
available at http://www.hazletoncity.org/090806/2006-18%20_Illegal%20Alien%20Immigr
ation%20Relief%20Act.pdf; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 (Jan. 22, 2007), available
at
https://www.farmersbranch.info/sites/default/files/Ordinance%20No%202903.pdf
(last
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problems like economic stress, increased language isolation, wage
depression, and overcrowding.5 These laws regulate immigrants in several
ways. To wit, they create immigration enforcement schemes; define new
state immigration crimes; promote English-only policies; and regulate
housing, public services, and employment of unauthorized migrants.6
This demography-based explanation for state and local involvement is a
familiar and intuitively appealing story relied upon by legal scholars,
popular media, and elected officials alike. For example, Professor Cristina
Rodriguez, in arguing for a functionalist understanding of local immigrant
regulation, maintains that the demographic shifts caused by globalization
and immigration “are felt differently in different parts of the country, and
the disruption immigration causes, as well as the viability of different
immigration strategies, will vary . . . .”7 Thus, divergent needs in localities
lead to contrasting approaches towards integrating and regulating the effects
of immigrants on local economies.8 Professor Clare Huntington writes that
“changing immigration patterns that have brought non-citizens to new parts
of the country . . . and to suburban and rural areas. . . . [I]t is notable that the
more punitive immigration measures often, although not always, are
enacted in areas new to receiving significant populations of non-citizens.”9
Many media reports have also invoked this same wisdom of immigrationinduced changes leading inexorably to policy pressures and legislative
action at the local level.10
Importantly, elected officials and restriction advocates have paired these
demographic claims with a complaint that the federal government has
forsaken its constitutional and statutory responsibility to control unwanted
immigration. In signing Arizona’s E-Verify law, then-Governor Janet
accessed Sept. 14, 2012) (held void and prohibited from being enforced in Villas at Parkside
Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008)).
5.
Lou Barletta, Mayor of Hazleton, Pa., Speech to the City Council of Hazleton, Pa.
(July 13, 2006) (claiming that undocumented individuals were sapping the city of resources)
(transcript available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/node/7).
6.
See, e.g., Escondido, Cal., Ordinance No. 2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/escondido_ordinance.pdf (preventing landlords from
renting or “harboring” illegal aliens in their property and imposing other related restrictions on
rental and eviction proceedings).
7.
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 609 (2008).
8.
Id. at 594 (“Communities are also jumping on the enforcement bandwagon because
they seek control over their rapidly changing environments.”).
9.
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 806 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007 (Magazine),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05Immigration-t.html?pagewanted=all.
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Napolitano (now Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security)
declared: “Immigration is a federal responsibility, but I signed [the law]
because it is now abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of
coping with the comprehensive immigration reforms our country needs.”11
Unable to wait any longer for the federal government to seal the border and
vigorously enforce provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 12
states and localities had to legislate to protect their residents and solve their
impending demographic crisis.
Undoubtedly, this conventional wisdom is appealing. However, it is, at
best, an incomplete account of the rise of subnational immigration
regulation; at worst, it is purposefully misleading. In prior empirical work,
we cast doubt on the factual premise undergirding much of the new
immigration federalism, showing that state and local immigration laws are
not, as commonly assumed, policy responses tailored to immigrationinduced demographic problems.13 That is, the primary justifications
undergirding most scholarly, political, and judicial explanations for this
recent spate of state and local immigration regulations have little empirical
support. Instead, restrictionist state and local laws are largely the product of
political partisanship, with Republican-heavy areas especially ripe for
political action.
Building on these original statistical findings, this paper advances a new,
dynamic theory of legislative action and inaction in immigration law. The
key theoretical deficiency with prior explanations is that they analyze
subnational policy proliferation and federal legislative stagnation as
independent, unconnected trends. Furthermore, both occur in an apolitical
context. By contrast, our proposed model—which we have termed the
“Polarized Change” model—explains developments at both levels, with
extra-constitutional political institutions (political parties) and key policy
actors (issue entrepreneurs) that catalyze immigration lawmaking. In the
Polarized Change model, party polarization and ethnic nationalism after
9/11 present opportunities for more restrictive legislation on immigration,
11. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor of the State of Ariz., to Hon. Jim Weiers,
Speaker of the House (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.countysupervisors.org/uploads/0707-02%20HB%202779%20Statement.pdf.
12. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–05 (2012) (defining, inter alia, the
class of persons who are unlawfully present and the process and standards for their discovery
and removal).
13. See infra Appendix; see also S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship,
Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in
TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica
Varsanyi, ed. 2011).
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and issue entrepreneurs press these advantages to push restrictionist
legislation in jurisdictions with ripe political conditions.
Our proposed mechanism offers a unique take on both the directionality
and intentionality of immigration policymaking. We argue that federal
inactivity and subfederal activity are linked and interdependent. Issue
entrepreneurs coordinate work across government levels, stalemating
Congressional action at important moments, and subsequently use this
“failure” to justify the proliferation of policies at the subfederal level. The
reimagined causality of the Polarized Change model is especially significant
because these state and local laws emerge within the constitutional context
of presumed federal primacy in the field. Enacting restrictive policies in
several jurisdictions normalizes the constitutional appropriateness of state
and local participation in immigration regulation. Accordingly, our revised
genesis story requires a change in commentators’ and courts’ evaluation of
the federalism dynamics inherent in state and local immigration regulation.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly presents the empirical
foundation of subfederal immigration policy proliferation, summarizing the
data and conclusions from our nationwide study of jurisdictions that have
passed restrictionist laws. Part II presents the Polarized Change model of
immigration regulation, focusing on the key role of issue entrepreneurs and
their use of party polarization and ethnic nationalism to promote a
restrictionist agenda. Here, the Article situates issue entrepreneurs and their
work within the legal, theoretical framework of legislative cascades and
political process analysis, highlighting examples of restrictionist legislative
activity over the past twelve years. Finally, Part III offers preliminary
thoughts on the impact of the Polarized Change model on federalism
debates.
Fundamentally, this Article calls for a revision of the conventional
narrative for the rise of subnational immigration regulation, and it suggests
a cohesive, empirically-based alternative for the phenomenon. It uniquely
contributes both legal doctrinal analysis and political science research to the
field of immigration federalism, and it may have broader ramifications for
federalism analysis generally. Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard
Pildes in a recent article argued that constitutional separation of powers
analysis is bankrupt without an account of the importance of political
parties in creating competition or cooperation between branches of the
federal government.14 Also, Dean Larry Kramer has long maintained that
14. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2314 (2006) (“[T]he invisibility of political parties has left constitutional
discourse about separation of powers with no conceptual resources to understand basic features
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political parties are the connective tissue binding federal and state actors,
accounting for subfederal concerns in the federal process. 15 While they
address different ideas and devices for diffusing national power, the
underlying message of both analyses is that theorists must look beyond
formal constitutional structures and should study political realities and
organizations to fully appreciate basic elements of our constitutional
design.16 In this tradition, we place the focus squarely on the political and
extra-legal dimension of immigration lawmaking, arguing that
understanding it is indispensable to judicial, scholarly, and public
evaluations of state and local involvement.
I.

THE EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL OF STATE
AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION

The accelerated flurry of subnational lawmaking over the past decade is
notable because it occurs against a background context of presumed federal
primacy in immigration matters.17 Since the late nineteenth century, aside
from niche areas in which subnational jurisdictions are permitted to enact
legislation affecting immigrants, federal law has displaced state and local
enactments regulating the entry, exit, conditions of stay of immigrants, and
of the American political system. It has also generated judicial decisions and theoretical
rationalizations that float entirely free of any functional justification grounded in the actual
workings of separation of powers.”).
15. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalsim, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (“Rather than the formal constitutional
structures highlighted in Wechsler’s original analysis, federalism . . . has been safeguarded by a
complex system of informal political institutions (of which political parties have historically
been the most important) . . . .”).
16. Id. at 285 (arguing that several institutions and dynamics, including political parties,
administrative bureaucracy, the intergovernmental lobby, and states, as recruiting and training
grounds, contribute to effective protection of states in the federalist system).
17. While state and local laws regulating movement and fitness for community residence
once were commonplace during the nineteenth century in the absence of federal law, after the
Civil War, Congress began asserting federal dominion over the field. See, e.g., Gerald L.
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833 (1993). Since that time, immigration regulation has been primarily a federal exercise, see
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259 (1875), and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875), with some limited leeway for
subnational legislation that affects immigrants. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct.
1968 (2011) (upholding state E-Verify law for businesses); Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)
(devolving decisions over public assistance eligibility on the basis of citizenship status to
states); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding state law prohibiting non-citizens
from becoming state troopers).
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the enforcement of such laws.18 More recently, however, states and
localities have renewed their interest in immigration regulation. The
National Council of State Legislatures reports over 7,000 state immigration
proposals over the last five years.19 States and localities are increasingly
considering and passing laws that create state immigration crimes, enact
state immigration enforcement schemes, regulate the renting of property to
certain noncitizens, penalize businesses for hiring unauthorized workers,
and discriminate in the provision of public services.20 In most instances, the
stated aim of this restrictive legislation is to discourage entry or residence of
unauthorized immigrants, or what many restrictionists have called “attrition
through enforcement.”21
A.

The Conventional Model

The conventional explanation for the recent spate of state and local laws
should be familiar to anyone paying attention to immigration policy. It
holds that policy stalemate at the federal level, combined with the pressure
created by the public policy challenges of recent and rapid demographic
changes, compel states and localities to legislate in a field they have no
choice but to enter. This sentiment was neatly encapsulated by Governor
Jan Brewer of Arizona in her signing statement accompanying the passage
of S.B. 1070, the law creating a state immigration enforcement scheme and
providing state criminal penalties for immigration violations (recently
enjoined, in part, by the Supreme Court22):
The bill I’m about to sign into law – Senate Bill 1070 – represents
another tool for our state to use as we work to solve a crisis we did
not create and the federal government has refused to fix….The
crisis caused by illegal immigration and Arizona’s porous border.
18.
19.

Neuman, supra note 17, at 1896–97.
NCSL 2011 Report on State Immigration Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=23960 (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
20. State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-laws-related-to-immigrationand-immigrants.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (summarizing immigration legislation
introduced in state legislative bodies).
21. Arizona’s SB1070 explicitly invoked this frame in Section 1 of the law: “The
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.” S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
22. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). (enjoining three out of four
challenged provisions, but declining to enjoin provision directing police officers to determine
immigration status on lawful stops and arrests).
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We in Arizona have been more than patient waiting for
Washington to act. But decades of federal inaction and misguided
policy have created a dangerous and unacceptable situation.23

Notably, Governor Pete Wilson conjured this same rhetoric when framing
the need for California’s Proposition 187 in 1994.24 Wilson promoted the
so-called “Save Our State Initiative” by depicting California as the victim of
federal failure.25
The conventional model of subnational immigration regulation is
represented in Figure 1 below:

23. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Statement by Governor Jan Brewer on the
signing of Senate Bill 1070 (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/
PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf; see also Letter from Janet Napolitano,
Governor of the State of Ariz., to Hon. Jim Weiers, Speaker of the House, (July 2, 2007),
available at http://www.countysupervisors.org/uploads/07-07-02%20HB%202779%20Statem
ent.pdf. (“Immigration is a federal responsibility, but I signed HB 2779 because it is now
abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of coping with the comprehensive
immigration reforms our country needs.”).
24. Proposition 187, codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (excluding
undocumented individuals from receiving any health care services from publicly-funded health
care facilities, except emergency medical care as required by federal law, and requiring that
facilities notify and provide information to the State Director of Health Services, the California
Attorney General, and the INS regarding undocumented individuals who seek health care
services); see also OFFICE OF THE CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET GEN.
ELECTION NOV. 8, 1994, 54–55 (1994), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/
1994g.pdf (containing argument in favor of proposition 187 and rebuttal).
25. See Peter Skerry, Many Borders to Cross: Is Immigration the Exclusive Responsibility
of the Federal Government?, 25 PUBLIUS (ISSUE 3) 71, 72 (1995).
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Figure 1. Conventional Model of Subnational Immigration Legislation

The chief virtue of the conventional model is its simplicity and intuitive
appeal;26 in other words, it just seems right. In addition to the widespread
acceptance that immigration policy has reached a stalemate at the national
level, it also makes intuitive sense that rapid migration and demographic
change are causing significant social dislocation and prompting
redistribution of some public goods. First, current economic studies suggest
that the fiscal benefits of immigration are more likely to be concentrated at
the national level while any short-term fiscal costs are more likely to be
borne by specific localities, particularly with respect to the provision of
public education, social services, and emergency room care.27
Second, it is evident that immigrants in recent years have been moving to
“new destinations”—areas with little or no history of immigrant settlement
in the past century.28 The emergence of these new destinations helps
augment the narrative of rapid, recent demographic change that many
assume to cause state and local legislative reactions. These settlement
26. While some may argue that the conventional understanding also includes an
appreciation of the role of politics, infra Part II, we explore the heretofore limited theoretical
and empirical development of these claims.
27. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON POPULATION & BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
EDUCATION, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF
IMMIGRATION (James P Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
28. Audrey Singer, Susan Wiley Hardwick & Caroline B. Brettell, TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY GATEWAYS: IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (Brookings
Institution Press, 2008). These so-called “new destinations” include places ranging from rural
Kansas and North Carolina to suburbs in Long Island and Georgia that have had little recent
history of immigration.
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patterns have brought renewed attention to issues such as day laborers,
unlicensed businesses, overcrowded housing, and illegal immigration. And,
judging from news coverage of conflicts and tensions in these new
destination areas, the presence and growth of low-skilled (and often
unauthorized) immigrant populations would seem to pose challenges for
local governance.29
Upon closer evidentiary analysis, however, this conventional model does
not hold. In our other work, we constructed a dataset of over 25,000
municipalities and all fifty states and, using multivariate regression analysis,
tested the salience of various factors hypothesized to induce state and local
policy response on immigration.30 As summarized below in Appendix A,
our analysis revealed that the demographic factors commonly assumed to
spur subfederal policy responses were not salient in predicting or explaining
the recent rise of such regulations. Instead, contexts of local partisanship
emerged as the highly salient factor explaining the spread of these laws,
with Republican-heavy areas much more likely to pass restrictive legislation
than Democrat-heavy areas.
Republican-heavy areas proved to be significant because they provide
ripe opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to propose and pass policies by
framing undocumented immigration as one of the most significant problems
for local governance. For instance, in 2006 and 2007, six cities in California
(Apple Valley, Costa Mesa, Escondido, Lancaster, Santa Clarita, and Vista)
passed restrictive ordinances on matters ranging from day laborers to

29. See, e.g., Paul Vitello, As Illegal Workers Hit Suburbs, Politicians Scramble to
Respond, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/nyregion/
06immigrate.html; Bob Dart, Minutemen Shadow Town’s Day Labor Site, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
April 5, 2006, http://www.galeo.org/story.php?story_id=0000001057.
30. See S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining
Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL:
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica Varsanyi, ed. 2011);
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: Its Political
Underpinnings and Legal Implications (working title) (manuscript in preparation); see also
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Restrictive State and Local Immigration
Laws: Solutions in Search of Problems, American Constitution Society Issue Brief at 6–11
(November 15, 2012) available at http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/restrictivestate-and-local-immigration-laws-solutions-in-search-of-proble
(summarizing
empirical
evaluation of the salience of the following factors proffered by scholars, judges media, and
elected officials as causing state and local policy response: population of new immigrants and
growth of Latino and foreign-born populations; high proportions of linguistically-isolated
households; overcrowded housing; Latino share and naturalized share of the citizen population;
economic stress and relative group deprivation; state-level policy climate; local economic
interests; and party composition of the electorate.).
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employers, and to landlords.31 These various municipalities shared little in
the way of large-scale recent immigration or rapid changes in local
unemployment, but they did share one common characteristic: electorates
that leaned heavily Republican (with a party registration advantage ranging
from sixteen percentage points to thirty percentage points in these cities) in
a state where registered Democrats had an eight percentage-point advantage
over Republicans.32 The political opportunities that Republican-heavy
municipalities present to policy entrepreneurs on immigration restriction
continued through 2010, as the Los Angeles Times reported on the
successful attempts of a local tea party activist in getting Republican-heavy
cities in Southern California such as Temecula and Murietta to pass
restrictive measures after failing to do the same in larger, politically diverse
cities such as Riverside and Ontario.33
Finally, in cases where policy entrepreneurs are not involved in local
efforts, political ambition may be a critical factor, as Republican-heavy
districts offer the chance for primary challengers to mobilize party activists
who care intensely about the issue of illegal immigration. This was evident
in Arizona as far back as 2004 and 2006, as long-standing Republican
incumbents such as Congressman Jim Kolbe faced competitive primary
elections from challengers who focused on immigration and border-control
issues.34 These intraparty dynamics continued through 2010, as Governor
Jan Brewer and Senator John McCain tacked to the far right on immigration
in order to fend off primary challengers.35

31. These are based on our data collection, which we describe in Appendix A.
32. For State party registration data, see CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION
OCT. 23, 2006 (2006), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-gen06/hist-reg-stats.pdf. Local party registration data for municipalities can be obtained from the
firm Aristotle, Inc.
33. Phil Willon, Conservative Inland Empire Cities Crack down on Illegal Workers, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/14/local/la-me-0212-e-verify20110214.
34. See Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/15immigration.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
35. See Katie Cobb, Immigration Law Breathes Life Into Brewer’s Re-Election Campaign,
FOX NEWS (June 12, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/10/immigration-lawbreathes-life-brewers-election-campaign/; Russell Goldman, John McCain Border Shift:
“Complete Danged Fence”, ABC NEWS (May 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/johnmccain-immigration-reversal-complete-danged-fence/story?id=10616090.
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A POLITICAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION: THE POLARIZED
CHANGE MODEL

While partisanship has a statistically stronger relationship than various
demographic factors in explaining legislative change, completing the
analysis requires us to determine how these political factors actually work
to produce such policy expressions. Notably, the kinds of political
explanations we offer here need to go beyond ad-hoc pronouncements on
the importance of politics, which have pointed to disparate factors such as
political interest groups,36 legacies of Jim Crow,37 and racial gaps between
voters and residents.38 Instead, we use the conclusions drawn from our
statistical findings to develop a more nuanced “polarized change” model of
subnational immigration regulation, proffering our theory on why
partisanship matters and how the political process has shaped both federal
and state legislative efforts. This new model, grounded in theoretical
frameworks provided by legal and political science scholarship, accounts
for our findings on partisanship and demography. It also incorporates
qualitative evidence gathered from news reports, interviews, and
congressional dynamics that highlight the work of selected policy activists
in immigration law.
The conventional model described in Part I is not just lacking
empirically; it is also lacking theoretically. It seeks to reduce the
phenomenon of state and local action to the combination of policy pressures
from below that confronts legislative inaction from above. But, in the case
of immigration policy, the status quo of legislative inaction is not the same
as having a blank policy slate on immigration. Since nearly its founding, the
federal government has passed legislation on citizenship and naturalization,
and since 1952, it has relied on the Immigration Nationality Act, with many
statutory provisions that have been added or amended over the years.39 In
36. Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28,
2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigrati
on-law. Notably, NPR has retracted one of the central claims made in the piece regarding the
role of the Corrections Corporation of America.
37. Martin Luther King III & Richard Trumka, Alabama’s Immigration Law: Jim Crow
Revisited, CNN.COM (Nov. 17, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/17/opinion/
trumka-king-civil-rights-alabama/index.html.
38. Daniel Gonzalez, SB 1070 Backlash Spurs Hispanics to Join Democrats, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, June 8, 2010 (“Arizona is different [from California] in that . . . the Latino vote is
lower, about 12 percent versus 21 percent.”).
39. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(abolishing the national original quota system in favor of annual Eastern and Western
Hemisphere ceilings); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
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addition to statutory provisions on the matter, immigration is also subject to
the various regulatory provisions and enforcement priorities of the
executive branch and subject to congressional oversight and budgetary
authority. By contrast, the status quo on issues such as publicity rights or
driverless vehicles are truly “blank slates” at the national level, with no
federal statutory or regulatory provisions on the matter.
Moreover, in defining federal failure, restrictionists have discounted the
role of the federal executive, focusing solely on the activity of the
legislature.40 Thus, discretionary decisions by the President and the
Department of Homeland Security to prioritize enforcement and tolerate
some level of unlawful presence and migration are necessarily—and
understandably—absent from restrictionists’ description of federal
dynamics. Federal gridlock is therefore exclusively framed as congressional
gridlock, and legislative enactment is promoted as the only constitutionally
significant aspect of federal immigration policy.
Defenders of the conventional model of subnational legislation may
concede that there is no policy vacuum on immigration at the national level
but still contend that existing federal laws and regulations, many enacted
decades ago, are ill-equipped to solve the policy challenges posed by recent
immigrants, particularly low-skilled, unauthorized immigrants from
Mexico. However, as we have already seen, the empirical evidence offers
little to support the contention that restrictive legislation is more common in
places with recent arrivals, or with more Mexican immigrants, or with more
Spanish-dominant households, or with more objective conditions for labor
competition between immigrants and the native born.41
Second, as many established models in the literature on public policy and
public opinion have shown, policy problems are not self-evident. Rather,
they depend on problem definition, attribution of blame, and political
93-518, 88 Stat. 1652 (adding a criminal penalty for farm labor contractors who knowingly hire
undocumented workers); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(changing the preference system for admission of immigrants to the United States and providing
for administrative naturalization).
40. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59
STAN. L. REV. 809, 844 (2007) (“Both the public debate and existing scholarship typically view
illegal immigration as an enforcement problem that needs to be solved. The high level of illegal
immigration is seen as reflecting the government’s failure to enforce the existing immigration
rules.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1827–42 (2011)
(noting that while legislation potentially identifies several million removable persons, other
aspects of the enforcement system—arrest, prosecution, and adjudication—only deal with a
fraction of that pool).
41. See infra Appendix B., Table B1.
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mobilization.42 As we have already demonstrated from our cross-sectional
analysis of localities and states, policy challenges related to increased
immigration constitute neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause for
restrictive legislative action at the subnational level. Furthermore, economic
rationales that stress the importance of wage competition and local fiscal
pressures are unable to account for the fact that restrictive efforts at the
local level rose sharply in 2006, during a time of low unemployment and
booming economic growth.
Finally, the conventional explanation assumes the existence of federal
failure, but provides no empirical or theoretical explanation for federal
inaction. If the factors that explain federal inaction on new immigration
legislation are wholly unrelated to the factors that can explain local action,
then having a two-tiered explanation may be sufficient—with partisan
gridlock explaining the former and demographic factors explaining the
latter. However, we find that this is not the case. Indeed, as we argue in the
next section, two sets of factors—what we characterize as party polarization
and ethnic nationalism—when mobilized by issue entrepreneurs, account
for both federal inaction and the rise in subnational legislation, and thus
have greater explanatory value than attempts to describe the two sets of
phenomena in a piecemeal manner.
In response, as an alternative to the empirically and theoretically lacking
conventional model, we propose a model of polarized change that
incorporates our findings on the saliency of partisanship and allows for the
possibility that a single mechanism influences both national and subnational
dynamics. The Polarized Change model draws on major theoretical
traditions in the public policy scholarship on legislative change, such as the
multiple streams tradition and the punctuated equilibrium framework of
policy change,43 and relates it to existing work in legal scholarship on
legislative cascades44 and private lawmaking.45 Much like in these other
frameworks, we argue in our model of polarized change that the entire
process of policy change on immigration—from opinion formation among
42. Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws
That Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2010); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Michael Mintrom,
Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738, 765–66 (1997).
43. See generally JOHN W KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(1984); FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1993).
44. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42.
45. See Barak Y. Orbach et al., Arming States’ Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers,
and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161 (2010).
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voters to agenda setting and legislation at the national and subnational
levels—is shaped powerfully by the work of political parties and issue
entrepreneurs (those who do the work of promoting the salience of a
particular issue, offering particular frames for understanding those issues,
providing particular solutions, and identifying opportunities and venues for
policy change).
Our framework highlights the influence of these issue entrepreneurs in
creating optimal conditions for subnational immigration regulation, framing
the narrative necessary for judicial and political acceptance of restrictionist
legislation, and targeting specific jurisdictions with partisan conditions that
are ripe for enacting such regulation, with an eye to more widespread
adoption. The key insight with this model is the connectedness—the unitary
nature—of both the dynamics at the federal and subfederal levels. Instead of
conceiving of these two aspects as independently moving parts, we suggest
that both are influenced concurrently. The stalling of the one (federal
legislation) provides the constitutional and political leverage for activity at
the other (state and local policies). Further, our alternate model showcases
how issue entrepreneurs have been able to intensify interparty polarization
and post-9/11 ethnic nationalism to effectively promote their causes.To be
clear, our description of this process is not intended, by itself, as a negative
judgment on the work of these entrepreneurs; rather, we seek to present a
more realistic appraisal of the mechanism producing subnational
immigration regulation.
A.

Description of the Polarized Change Model

The underlying premise of the Polarized Change model is that policy
challenges resulting from demographic change do not inexorably produce
legislative efforts at policy change. Calls for policy change emerge even
without underlying objective conditions such as rapidly growing immigrant
populations (these are not necessary conditions); further, objective
conditions often do not lead to efforts at local legislation (these are not
sufficient conditions).What is more important than the objective basis for a
policy problem is its perceived existence and importance among those who
are critical to the legislative process.46

46. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 741–47 (arguing that cognitive
biases—like susceptibility to availability cascades, in which limited, available information
becomes dominant and accepted—that affect officials and those advocating for change can lead
to suboptimal policy outcomes); Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About

1446

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

In Figure 2, we situate the role of issue entrepreneurs in the larger
process of immigration policy change.While one may typically think of
elected representatives as key actors on legislation, we show that in the case
of state and local legislation on immigration, issue entrepreneurs play an
outsized role. These key actors coordinate action across local jurisdictions
and between levels of government. In various jurisdictions, restrictionist
issue entrepreneurs also create model legislation that can be easily
mimicked, and they craft such legislation to test the limits of constitutional
constraints at the subfederal level.47 Critically, based on our empirical
analysis and theoretical reasoning, we eliminate the “demographic change
and public policy problems” found in Figure 1 (Conventional Model), and
we replace it with the “perceived existence of policy problem,”
underscoring the subjective nature of such claims and their production
through a process of politicization.48
To be clear, we are not claiming that issue entrepreneurs are solely
responsible for the way that immigration policy has developed at the
national and local level since 2001. Instead, they play a central role in
taking advantage of opportunities that are themselves generated by two
other historical and institutional factors: party polarization (which includes
the rise of interparty divisions in Washington D.C. after 2000 and the
elimination of moderates within the Republican Party through competitive
party primaries after 2004) and ethnic nationalism (which encapsulates the
twin rise in racial and cultural antipathy in immigration discourse and
concerns about homeland security after the September 11, 2001 attacks). As
we show in the next section, party polarization presented the opportunity to
shift immigration policy away from a bargaining dynamic among varied
interest groups and legislators where compromise is possible to a pattern of
entrenchment where interparty divisions engender gridlock through the use
of filibusters.49 And the rise of national security concerns presented
Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589 (2007) (arguing that
framing of problems by “elites” affects how citizenry views a problem and its solution).
47. See, e.g., Immigration Reform Law Institute, Model Federal, State, and Local Laws,
available at http://irli.org/laws; IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE, PRO-ENGLISH MODEL
LOCAL ORDINANCE (2006), available at http://irli.org/system/files/Pro-English%20Model%
20OEO.pdf.
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49. See generally DANIEL TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES (2002) (arguing that the extent to
which parties can prevent “strange bedfellow” coalitions depends, to some extent, to whether
the issue at hand has one dimension on which parties can differentiate, or two dimensions that
typically lead to instability in decisionmaking). On issues of low public salience, such as tax
policy, Congressional logrolls along committee lines and interest group access can play more
prominent roles. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 193–223 (1990).
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opportunities to expand the rhetorical scope of ethnic nationalism and its
salience to a wider population.
Figure 2. Polarized Change Model of Subnational Immigration Legislation

Still, the mere existence of these two factors does not automatically lead
to policy change. In most cases, immigration issue entrepreneurs remain the
critical actors: they challenged moderate Republicans well before the Tea
Party’s rise in 2009, they helped to shift immigration policy from an interest
group bargain to a partisan stalemate, and they were early champions of this
“border security” variant of ethnic nationalism, mobilizing constituents and
pressuring legislators to resist the existential threat represented by
immigrants.50 In addition to capitalizing on these factors to block bipartisan
legislation at the national level, these issue entrepreneurs have also played
an important role at the subnational level: identifying the places where
50. See, e.g., Shortfalls of the 1986 Immigration Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Rosemary Jenks, Director of Government
Relations, NumbersUSA) (describing terrorists gaming the U.S. immigration system), available
at
https://www.numbersusa.com/content/files/pdf/2007-04-19%201986%20IRCA%20Mista
kes.pdf.
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opportunities are greatest, offering model legislation and political counsel to
ensure legislative passage, and lending legal expertise to ensure that the
provisions have a colorable constitutional basis.51
B.

The Polarized Change Model in Theory and Practice

In this section, we flesh out the details of the Polarized Change model as
it applies to immigration legislation at the national and subnational levels.
First, we use existing theoretical frameworks on policy proliferation and
federalism dynamics to identify and describe the class of key policy actors
we call issue entrepreneurs. Then, we provide a few examples from the past
decade of issue entrepreneurs in action, noting the two contextual factors
that have structured the opportunities for legislative change on immigration
since 2001: the rise of party polarization and ethnic nationalism.
To develop this narrative, we take a close look at key instances of
Congressional and subnational immigration action. Thus, complementing
the quantitative data used to discredit the demographic explanations of the
conventional model, here we analyze qualitative data from news reports and
in-depth interviews to show how issue entrepreneurs work in the
immigration legislative landscape.52 Our analysis here gets into the minutiae
of the policy and political work of key actors and events in immigration
lawmaking. This rich description of the political capture and mechanism of
policy change is vital to understanding the deficits of the conventional
model and evaluating the difference the polarized change model makes for
constitutional evaluation of subnational policy.
1.

The Agents of Polarized Change—Restrictionist Issue
Entrepreneurs

Who are these issue entrepreneurs on immigration, and how did they
mobilize and coordinate action at the national and local levels? One way to
think of these actors would be to include those whose activism has
51. See infra Part II.B.
52. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that without the work of these vital actors, the
immigration landscape—both nationally and subnationally—would appear drastically different.
That is, without these actors, we would expect to have passed comprehensive immigration
reform, and decreases in subnational immigration policymaking. Due to space constraints, our
discussion of the qualitative findings is abridged here. For more the role of party polarization,
ethnic nationalism, and issue entrepreneurs. See generally KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN,
POLARIZED CHANGE: THE POLITICIZATION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AT THE STATE AND LOCAL
LEVEL (working title) (manuscript in preparation).
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generated national news, and who seek to influence policy on immigration
beyond their immediate jurisdiction. Such a definition, however, would
produce a list that is extremely long, including: local representatives such
as Lou Barletta (former mayor of Hazleton, PA); law enforcement officials
such as Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, AZ; state legislators such as
Russell Pearce (R-AZ) and Virgil Peck (R-KS); governors such as Jan
Brewer (R-AZ) and Robert Bentley (R-AL); U.S. Representatives such as
Tom Tancredo (R-CO), Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), and Steve King (R-IA);
advocacy groups such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform
and NumbersUSA; research organizations such as the Center for
Immigration Studies; national radio personalities such as Glenn Beck, John
Kobylt, and Kenneth Chiampou; television personalities such as Lou Dobbs
(formerly of CNN) and Bill O’Reilly (Fox News); legal advocates such as
Kris Kobach’ and other organizations such as the American Legislative
Exchange Council whose concerns lie well beyond immigration but who
have nonetheless played a role in coordinating restrictive legislative efforts
across states on the issue.
Such a broad definition is not only unwieldy from an empirical
perspective, it is also unhelpful for our theoretical model of polarized
change, which reserves the label of issue entrepreneur for those actors who
have been involved at both levels and have been central to proliferation at
the subnational level (Figure 2). While we acknowledge that all these
players influence immigration policy, we focus on this narrower set because
of their multilevel reach and forward-thinking legislative strategy. As we
argue in Part III, the activities of these actors are much more consequential
for considerations of federalism because they challenge standard
assumptions that undergird federalism analysis generally and immigration
federalism analysis specifically.
We arrive at a narrower, theoretically cogent set of actors by applying
and modifying existing legal frameworks for policy instantiation. Using
Professors Sunstein and Kuran’s work on availability cascades, 53 Professor
Catherine Carpenter’s elucidation of policy proliferation, 54 and Michael
Mintrom’s work on policy entrepreneurs,55 we establish the following key
criteria for identifying restrictionist issue entrepreneurs for our model. First,
issue entrepreneurs take advantage of limited public knowledge about
immigration policy and problems. Relatedly, they link restrictionist policy
goals with the rhetoric of state and local autonomy. Third, they are able to
53.
54.
55.

Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42.
Carpenter, supra note 42.
Mintrom, supra note 42.
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recruit the wider set of actors described above to their cause. Finally, these
actors work in a network, each specializing in a set of tasks that, when
coordinated with other entrepreneurs, leads to policy proliferation at the
local level and timely legislative gridlock at the national level.
Applying this framework, the identities and achievements of
restrictionist issue entrepreneurs comes into clearer focus. Based on their
consistent and influential work, we identify five key entrepreneurial
individuals and organizations: (1) Tom Tancredo (U.S. Representative from
Colorado and a 2008 presidential candidate), (2) Kris Kobach (legal counsel
to restrictionist organizations and jurisdictions and coauthor of Arizona’s
SB1070 law), (3) Lou Dobbs (former host of a prime-time CNN program),
and the organizations, (4) the Federation for American Immigration Reform
(FAIR), and (5) NumbersUSA. Below, we first amplify the theoretical
foundation of our selection of these particular entrepreneurs. Second, to
familiarize readers, we provide a brief description of each of these key
figures and the roles they’ve played in national and subnational immigration
policy over the past decade.
The idea of interested private parties and organization that coalesce
around an issue or cause and then employ various methods to influence
public policy related to that cause is well-studied.56 These descriptions
distinguish a distinct species of policy actors who seek policy change by
helping frame challenges, disseminating information (or misinformation),
networking across jurisdictional lines, and raising money for such

56. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 17 (2010); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve
the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007); Harold Hongju Koh, The
1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998)
(describing the influence of norm entrepreneurs in changing domestic attitudes about equality);
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 687 (describing social agents who understand availability
heuristics and attempt to trigger availability cascades to achieve policy goals); Mintrom, supra
note 42, at 739 (identifying policy entrepreneurs as a class of policy actors who seek dynamic
policy change, and noting that policies are more likely to be considered and approved when
such actors are present); Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1163 (discussing the work of private
lawmakers who use gun rights as a policy-vehicle to effect a broader states’ rights platform);
Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 90 (1999) (describing
persons who are eager to exploit group pathologies to achieve an end). Indeed, even the use of
the term “entrepreneur” to describe that population has been prominent in the literature. Both
legal and political science commentators have identified the work and importance of
“availability entrepreneurs,” “policy entrepreneurs,” “political entrepreneurs,” “social
entrepreneurs,” “norm entrepreneurs,” and “private lawmakers” in galvanizing lawmaking.
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activities.57 Other scholars have even noted immigration entrepreneurs (Kris
Kobach) by name.58
The “issue entrepreneurs” we identify in the Polarized Change model are
the evolved descendants of these political actors. The descriptor “issue”
emphasizes that these actors appear to truly care about, and believe in, the
substantive restrictionist position they attempt to achieve. Immigration issue
entrepreneurs do not seem to be using a restrictionist agenda as a
convenient vehicle to activate a broader states or local rights platform.59 As
such, they not only promote their policy vision at the subfederal level, they
concurrently undermine other state and local efforts aimed at integrating or
ameliorating conditions for unauthorized immigrants.60 In other words, they
care about state and local power only to the extent it serves their substantive
policy goals.
The work of restrictionist issue entrepreneurs at the subnational level is a
real-time illustration of Professors Sunstein’s and Kuran’s analysis of the
influence of information deficits and reputational concerns on public
policy.61 As they note, in a policy debate, sometimes advocates for the
objectively weaker or even empirically incorrect side can triumph in the
legislative and political sphere by exploiting the cognitive biases of the
public and elected officials.62 In such cascades, interested persons take
57. See, e.g., Mintrom, supra note 42, at 739–41; Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1167;
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 714.
58. Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1163 (noting that federal policies in immigration are
prime targets for private lawmakers) and at 1166 (identifying former law professor, and now
elected official, Kris Kobach as a private lawmaker in the immigration field).
59. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 56, at 36 (“Few with influence in the political process care
about promoting state power as an end in itself.”). But see Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1178
(arguing that private lawmakers in the gun rights area use those laws as a way to return the
Supreme Court to a pre-New Deal Congressional power jurisprudence).
60. The Immigration Reform Law Institute, the legal arm of the Federation for American
Immigration Reform, challenged the provision of in-state tuition for unauthorized immigrant
students and municipal identification cards for all city residents regardless of their immigration
status. John Coté, Judge Tosses Challenge to S.F. ID Card Plan, S.F. CHRON., October 15,
2008, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Judge-tosses-challenge-to-S-F-ID-card-plan-32653
62.php; David Savage, Supreme Court Allows California to Grant In-State Tuition to Illegal
Immigrants, LA TIMES, June 6, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/06/news/sc-dc-0607court-tuition-20110607.
61. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 685–701 (discussing how availability cascades
can generate widespread mistaken beliefs because of informational availability and reputational
concerns, and the susceptibility of the public and elected officials to cognitive biases in
information processes).
62. Id. at 714; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (2001) (describing how, in the absence of their own private
information, people tend to follow others, and this process helps reach extreme policy
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advantage of limited, and often incorrect, information about an issue or
apparent problem to drive public policy.63 Foremost amongst the
informational deficits exploited by restrictionist issue entrepreneurs are the
generally held beliefs that undergird the conventional model of subnational
regulation: that, in any particular jurisdiction, immigrants are causing
uniquely insurmountable public policy programs that require restrictionist
legal responses—in other words, the same propositions undermined by our
empirical inquiry.
These informational claims, however, are particularly sticky, persisting
despite the experience of jurisdictions passing immigration legislation—
from Riverside, New Jersey, and the states of Oklahoma and Alabama—
which have all suffered greater economic distress after the legislation
passed and subsequently drove out labor and consumer sources.64 Similarly,
the idea of immigrant criminality motivating laws like Arizona’s SB 1070,65
has been proven to be a “myth.”66 Despite a marked drop in violent crime in
Arizona, issue entrepreneurs, as purveyors and disseminators of
immigration “facts,” have consistently galvanized receptive constituencies
positions); Talley, supra note 56, at 90 (discussing how “social entrepreneurs” are eager to
exploit group pathologies).
63. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 685–701; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative
Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (2001) (describing how, in the
absence of their own private information, people tend to follow others, and this process helps
reach extreme policy positions); Talley, supra note 56, at 90 (discussing how “social
entrepreneurs” are eager to exploit group pathologies).
64. See Patrik Jonsson, Why Republicans Are Doing an About-face on Tough Alabama
Immigration Law, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 16, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Politics/2011/1116/Why-Republicans-are-doing-an-about-face-on-tough-Alabama-immigr
ation-law (“Prof. Samuel Addy at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the
University of Alabama recently predicted that HB 56 will reduce the Alabama economy by $40
million as income and spending by both illegal and legal Hispanic immigrants will decline.
What's more, employers face troves of fresh paperwork and licensing requirements to comply
with the law that they say will potentially hurt business.”); Peter J. Spiro, Be Careful What You
Wish For, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/
should-alabama-schools-help-catch-illegal-immigrants/be-careful-what-you-wish-for-alabama
(arguing that Alabama’s law, driving out immigrants, will force the state to learn the importance
of immigrants to its economic well-being); PBS NewsHour: Alabama’s Immigration Law:
Assessing the Economic, Social Impact (PBS broadcast Oct. 13, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec11/alimmigration_10-13.html).
65. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) §§ 2–6 (providing state criminal
penalties for unlawful presence and unauthorized solicitation of work).
66. Rubén G. Rumbaut et. al., Debunking the The Myth of Immigrant Criminality:
Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFORMATION
SOURCE (Oct. 10, 2012, 12:02 PM), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/
display.cfm?id=403.
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with their message of the danger posed by migrants.67 Thus, similar to the
policy actors described by other scholars, restrictionist issue entrepreneurs
are able to succeed and endure, despite championing empirically dubious
claims.68
The issue entrepreneurs’ key intuition—connecting these substantive
misperceptions and subnational policy proliferation—is exploitation of the
discourse of state and local rights for their particular policy ends.
Restrictionist issue entrepreneurs are able to effectively deploy federalism
tropes to rally local majorities and elected officials to their cause. Recent
political science research suggests that federalism-based framing of policy
issues by political elites are consequential to citizens’ beliefs and voting. 69
As such, the ability of restrictionist issue entrepreneurs to target willing
elected officials, and supply those officials with federalism-based rhetoric
to defend substantive immigration enforcement positions, measurably
influences the failure of federal proposals.70 Even if national majorities
favor certain aspects of federal immigration reform,71 significant
constituencies within that diffuse majority may be convinced to oppose
specific national reforms to preserve state involvement in enforcement
schemes. This may be especially true after enactment of a state or local
policy, as citizens who previously were agnostic towards restrictionist
legislation may now support the restrictionist laws, not because of the
substantive policy position, but to protect state and local authority.
In addition, Carpenter notes that a few, intensely interested actors are
sufficient to trigger a legislative epidemic, if those actors are properly
credentialed and positioned.72 A key characteristic of this small group, she
maintains, is the ability to recruit other credentialed and influential actors,
like the larger group of officials, organizations, and media personalities
listed above. Because of the opportunities presented by party polarization,
this broader set of elected actors is easy to discover for immigration policy
67. Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2010, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/us/
20crime.html?pagewanted=all.
68. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 42, at 1, 37, 56; Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 714
(noting that the objectively weaker side may triumph by exploiting cognitive biases).
69. Kam & Mikos, supra note 46, at 592–601.
70. Cf. id. at 601 (noting that the federalism rhetoric of politicians is salient in influencing
voter attitudes towards federal legislation).
71. Scott Keeter, Where the Public Stands on Immigration Reform, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Nov. 23, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1421/where-the-public-stands-onimmigration-reform.
72. Carpenter, supra note 42, at 29.
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purposes. State and local officials naturally fit into the entrepreneurial
framework as they are key facilitators and molders of public perception. 73
With their considerable experience in channeling and mobilizing public
opinion for electoral gains, these officials can effectively frame and
promote the issue entrepreneurs message that demographic “facts” cause
urgent policy problems.74
Finally, immigration issue entrepreneurs must be appropriately
networked, showcasing the ability—as a collective whole—to work across
multiple jurisdictions, both among the many states and localities, and
between federal and subfederal levels.75 Each of these actors also performs a
specialized set of critical roles: lobbying federal legislators to block
legislative efforts, designing model legislation for the state and local levels,
offering legal counsel and expertise, framing and making immigration
issues salient to the general public, mobilizing and informing issue activists,
and keeping unseemly, race-specific immigration discourse out of
mainstream.
As we describe in detail below, the five issue entrepreneurs we select
based on this framework may fill many of these roles within a networked
system. Further, as a group, they evince the ability to fulfill the prerequisites
for policy proliferation and legislative cascades described in the literature,
using a unique combination of demographic “facts” and federalism rhetoric
uniquely available in the immigration context.
(1) Tom Tancredo played a sustained and crucial role in organizing the
legislative opposition to bipartisan federalism solutions that included a path
to citizenship for the unauthorized immigrant population in the United
States. As early as 2001, he publicly countered White House attempts to
gather support for a legalization program after the State Visit of Vicente
Fox to Washington, D.C.76 Subsequently, Tancredo recruited new members
into the Immigration Reform Caucus, a group that successfully prevented or
delayed bipartisan attempts at federal immigration reform by the White
73. Hills, supra note 56, at 21 (“State and local politicians, however, are natural policy
entrepreneurs who can significantly influence what sorts of conditions are publicly recognized
as problems. . . . The entrepreneur can transform a social condition that everone has taken for
granted into a problem that must be addressed by recategorizing the issue and offering different
comparisons for judging whether the issue is being acceptably handled.”).
74. Carpenter, supra note 42, at 40.
75. Mintrom, supra note 42, at 739, 760.
76. Newshour with Jim Lehrer, Immigration Challenge (PBS television broadcast Sept. 6,
2001) (Representative Tancredo discussing his opposition to various aspects of then-proposed
immigration reforms) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/congress/julydec01/immigration_9-6.html).
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House and Senators Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA).77
Tancredo’s success in blocking bipartisan legislation on immigration
continued through the 2006 and 2007 efforts at comprehensive immigration
reform as he rallied conservatives in the House and Senate to oppose
provisions in the bill that would lead to an eventual path to citizenship.78
During his time in Congress he commanded a sizable group of legislatures
in the Immigration Reform Caucus, providing him the power to access party
leadership and influence House votes.79 He also entered the Presidential race
in 2007, seeking to force other candidates to address the topic of illegal
immigration.80
Finally, Tancredo has also been heavily involved in promoting the
salience of immigration across various states and localities. He did so by
introducing bills and amendments to withdraw federal funding from socalled “sanctuary cities,”81 proposing that legislators and mayors who
championed such legislation face criminal charges,82 urging the Department
of Homeland not to undermine the enforcement efforts of groups such as
the Minuteman Project,83 and lending support to legislative efforts against
illegal immigration in states such as Pennsylvania84 and Arizona.85
77. See, e.g., Immigration, Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of
2002, S. 2444, 107th Cong. (2002). Congressman Tom Tancredo chaired the Immigration
Reform Caucus from its creation in May of 1999 until February of 2007. About Us,
IMMIGRATION REFORM CAUCUS, http://irc.bilbray.house.gov/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
78. Carl Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, Bush Faces Resistance on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2006; Lou Dobbs Tonight (Fox television broadcast June 5, 2007).
79. M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Debate on Immigration Bill in Congress pleases Tancredo After
Years of Pushing the Issue: Littleton Republican has Ear of GOP Leadership, DENV. ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, Dec. 16, 2005 (“[O]n Thursday [during a House vote on Rep. Sensenbrenner’s
employment verification bill], [Tancredo] had a direct line to Republican leadership because
without the support of his hard-line immigration caucus, it was unlikely they could pass
anything to appease an increasingly vocal part of the Republican base.”).
80. Jeff Zeleny, THE 2008 CAMPAIGN: Rep. Tancredo of Colorado Enters G.O.P.
Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007 (“His intention is to force other Republican
candidates, particularly Senator John McCain of Arizona, former Gov. Mitt Romney of
Massachusetts and former Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York, to address illegal
immigration.”).
81. H.AMDT. 294, 110th Cong. (2007), amending H.R. 2638, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HZ294:.
82. Beverly Wang, Tancredo Targets N.H. “Sanctuary State” Bill, DENV. POST, Sept. 5,
2007, http://www.thenewhampshireprimary.com/news/2007_09_05_news_nation1.html.
83. H.R. Res. 839, 109th Cong. (2006).
84. High Beam Research, Lawmakers Introduce All-Encompassing National Security
Begins at Home Illegal Immigration Reform Package, US FED NEWS SERVICE, INCLUDING US
STATE NEWS (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1346939381.html.
85. Luige del Puerto, Tancredo Forms Group Opposing Pearce Recall, ARIZ. CAPITOL
TIMES, July 25, 2011, http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2011/07/25/tancredo-forms-group-oppos
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(2) While Tancredo is an example of an issue entrepreneur whose
involvement tended to a greater focus on the national level, Kris Kobach is
an individual whose dual involvement has generally favored the state and
local levels. Kobach’s first major involvement in immigration control was
his authorship of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(NSEERS) in his role as chief advisor to Attorney General John Ashcroft on
immigration and border enforcement.86 However, most of his subsequent
involvement on immigration has been at the state and local levels. As early
as 2002, Kobach authored a memo while working at the Department of
Justice that called for “allow[ing] local police officers to make arrests for
civil violations of immigration law,” a move that was initially opposed by
the White House but subsequently adopted by the Office of Legal
Counsel.87 After moving to Kansas where he worked first as a law professor
and then as Secretary of State, Kobach has served as legal counsel for many
states and localities that have passed restrictive legislation, including the
city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, whose employer and landlord sanctions are
pending Court review;88 the city of Farmers Beach, Texas (Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas)89; and the city of
Valley Park, Missouri (Gray v. City of Valley Park, Missouri).90 Kobach is
also providing legal counsel on constitutional challenges involving state
legislation in Arizona and Alabama.91
ing-pearce-recall (stating Tancredo’s Team America PAC, whose singular focus is on
eliminating illegal immigration to the United States, set up a fundraising committee in 2011 to
defend Russell Pearce, Arizona State Senator and chief architect of the state’s SB1070 law);
Gary Nelson, Pearce Basks in Adulation at Rally, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 2011,
http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/2011/10/17/20111017russell-pearce-rally10
19.html.
86. Kris Kobach, Resume, http://www.kssos.org/forms/administration/Kobach_Bio_
Resume.pdf.
87. Eric Schmitt, Administration Split on Local Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/29/us/administration-split-on-local-role-in-terrorfight.html (“Critics are also upset that Mr. Ashcroft . . . has given . . . [Kobach] a leading role in
developing the delicate policy even though Mr. Kobach, 36, is only a White House Fellow on
temporary assignment to the Justice Department this year.”). A 2002 Office of Legal Counsel
Memorandum advances the position taken by Kobach.
88. Kent Jackson, Top Court Gives City 2nd Chance, STANDARD SPEAKER, June 7, 2011,
http://standardspeaker.com/news/top-court-gives-city-2nd-chance-1.1158117
(noting
that
Kobach, attorney for Hazleton, was encouraged by the Supreme Court’s Whiting decision,
arguing that it “put Hazleton on very strong ground” for remand consideration in front of the
Third Circuit).
89. 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
90. 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009).
91. Counsel List - 567 U.S., Part 2, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/counsellists/counsellistsview.aspx?Filename=cl567-2.html.
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Perhaps more centrally to our model of issue entrepreneurship, Kobach
has authored much of the subnational legislation wending its way through
the courts, with each subsequent effort expanding the scope of subnational
participation in immigration enforcement.92 Kobach’s entrepreneurship is
perhaps most evident in Alabama’s HB56 in 2011. As reported in the
Mobile Press-Register:
“Kobach got his introduction to Alabama politics in 2007, through
a conference hosted in Birmingham by the Eagle Forum of
Alabama, a conservative think tank. There, he met state Sen. Scott
Beason, R-Gardendale, who said the two developed a relationship
that centered on their shared concerns about the nation’s
immigration policy.
Beason, who carried the immigration bill in the Alabama Senate,
said he leaned heavily on Kobach to help write it.93

As Kobach’s entrepreneurial work in Alabama reveals, state legislation
on immigration is not a simple matter of homegrown solutions to persistent
and thorny local problems, as legislators often portray the issue.94 Instead, it
often involves sponsorship and expertise from outside actors, who make
critical choices on venues based on political opportunities (large Republican
majorities in the legislature and a Republican governor), to build a case for
the necessity and constitutionality of subfederal action. We will explain the
strategic benefits of this particular method of policy proliferation in greater
detail in Part III.B below.
Issue entrepreneurship is not merely the handiwork of a few individuals.
Indeed, the most intensive and sustained involvement in this issue has been
provided by the organizations Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA. These organizations have devoted
considerable resources, both to defeat moderate legislation at the national
level and promote restriction at the subnational level.95 They have large
92. See, for instance, the expanded scope of Alabama’s HB56 in 2011, which passed one
year after Arizona’s SB1070. Alan Gomez, States Make Daily Life Harder for Illegal
Immigrants, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 2011, http://usatoday.com/news/nation/story/
2011-12-20/illegal-immigrants-contracts-void/52132602/1.
93. George Talbot, Kris Kobach, the Kansas Lawyer Behind Alabama’s Immigration Law,
PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, AL), Oct. 16, 2011, available at http://blog.al.com/live/2011/
10/kris_kobach_the_kansas_lawyer_1.html.
94. Indeed it is likely that a homegrown effort would have avoided post-enactment
handwringing, and a vow by the Alabama Governor to revisit and amend the legislation to cure
several economic and social issues it has created for the state.
95. FAIR spent $3.44 million on lobbying between 1998 and 2011. Influence & Lobbying:
Federation for Amer Immigration Reform, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lob
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national memberships and can mobilize public phone and email campaigns
to national lawmakers that produce tangible results.96 Importantly, these
organizations bring a considerable measure of institutional investment and
continuity that individuals like Tancredo and Kobach lack. Thus, while
Tancredo’s leadership on the issue declined after his departure from the
U.S. Congress, and Kobach’s centrality rose only after 2005, FAIR has been
an enduring advocate for immigration restriction since 1979, and
NumbersUSA has been doing so since 1997.97 Both organizations have had
their greatest impact after 2001.
(3) FAIR boasts a national membership of over 250,000 individuals and,
since its founding, has advocated for sharp reductions in legal and illegal
immigration, including “a temporary moratorium on all immigration except
spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens and a limited number of
refugees.”98 In its first two decades, the organization focused its advocacy
on legislation and enforcement at the national level, but it has also
broadened its efforts with state lobbyists and regional field offices. 99 While
the organization does not have local chapters, it works in partnership with
other organizations, often providing legal and political expertise, as well as
resources and personnel to local legislative campaigns.100 Indeed, as the Los
Angeles Times reported in 1994, FAIR’s lobbyist in Sacramento, Alan
Nelson, helped write the state’s restrictive ballot measure, Proposition
187.101 By 2004, FAIR got much more directly involved in supporting state
by/clientsum.php?id=D000050827&year=2012. NumbersUSA spent $3.47 million on lobbying
between 2001 and 2011. Influence & Lobbying: NumbersUSA.com, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000054867&year=2012.
96. Robert Pear, Little-Known Group Claims a Win on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2007; Nicole Gaouette, Immigration Bill Ignites A Grass-Roots Fire On The Right, L.A. TIMES,
June 24, 2007.
97. About FAIR, FAIRUS.ORG, http://www.fairus.org/about (last visited Nov. 10, 2012);
About NumbersUSA, NUMBERSUSA.COM (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
98. Id.
99. FAIR hired its current National Field Director in 2002 and supports local immigration
reform groups in 33 states and the District of Columbia. Telephone Interview with FAIR staff
member (Apr. 2012); see also Join a Local Immigration Reform Group, FAIRUS.ORG,
http://www.fairus.org/action/local-group (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
100. FAIR has provided testimony, reports, briefs, and issue letters to numerous state and
local legislative bodies. See FAIR’s Testimony and Comments, FAIRUS.ORG,
http://www.fairus.org/legislation/testimony (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). One early example of
assistance on state-level efforts was in litigation over Proposition 200 in Arizona in 2004. See
Proposition 200 Should be Implemented as the Voters Intended: Illegal Immigrants Must be
Barred from Receiving All Nonemergency Benefits, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 19, 2004.
101. Paul Feldman, Group’s Funding of Immigration Measure Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
10, 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-09-10/local/me-36690_1_pioneer-fund (“When
former federal immigration chief Nelson helped write the initiative last year, he was a
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legislative efforts: it financially-backed Arizona’s Proposition 200
campaign, a measure modeled after Proposition 187 that sought to deny
unauthorized immigrants access to many public benefits;102 it subsequently
filed a lawsuit in Arizona to make sure that the benefit provisions would be
interpreted broadly.103
Since 2004, FAIR has institutionalized its legal support of state and local
ordinances through its legal affiliate, the Immigration Reform Law Institute
(IRLI).104 This group, with Michael Hethmon and Kris Kobach as lead
advisors, offers legal counsel and model legislation to states and localities
contemplating restrictive action and challenges state and local laws when
they expand the rights of unauthorized immigrant residents in cases such as
the California provision allowing in-state college tuition for unauthorized
immigrants who graduate from the state’s high schools 105 and San
Francisco’s issuance of municipal identification cards.106
(4) Along with FAIR (and its legal arm, IRLI), NumbersUSA is the other
major organizational force in immigration politics, fulfilling the vital role of
derailing attempts at national, comprehensive immigration legislation
through its work with specific legislators. The national organization was
founded in 1997 by Roy Beck, advocate for immigration reduction and
author of a best-selling book on the topic in 1996.107 Critical to the group’s
founding was Dr. John Tanton, a one-time environmentalist turned
Sacramento lobbyist for the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a national
organization that advocates sealing the nation’s borders and reducing immigration.”). Note,
however, that the ballot sponsors denied that the organization was directly involved.
102. Steven Wall, Efforts Against Illegal Immigrants Rise, SAN BERNARDINO SUN, Nov. 9,
2004.
103. At the trial court, Yes on Proposition 200 v. Napolitano, CV2004-092999 (Ariz. Sup.
Ct. 2004), Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed. However, on appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against the Governor and
allowed Plaintiffs leave to file second amended complaint. Yes on Prop 200 v. Napolitano, 215
Ariz. 458, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); see also Suit Filed Over AG’s Opinion On Public Benefits
Under Prop 200, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2004.
104. “The Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI) is FAIR’s affiliated legal organization.
. . . IRLI works extensively with state and local governments to design legislation that
effectively addresses problems resulting from illegal immigration.” The Immigration Reform
Law Institute, FAIRUS.ORG, http://www.fairus.org/Default.aspx?PageID=12564537.
105. The Immigration Reform Law Institute appealed the case of Martinez v. Regents of the
University of California, 241 P.3d 855 (2010), to the U.S. Supreme Court, where certiorari was
denied, 131 S.Ct. 2961 (2011); see also Savage, supra note 60.
106. Coté, supra note 60.
107. See Roy Beck, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION (1996) (arguing that immigration
adversely affects the U.S. labor market, the environment, and local community systems); About
Us: Early History, NUMBERSUSA, http://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/about/roy-beckexecutive-director.html.
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immigration crusader who spawned a number of prominent organizations
like FAIR, NumbersUSA, and the Center for Immigration Studies.108
Groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center have long contended that
Tanton’s network is a multipronged effort at mobilizing racial antipathy
towards Latinos,109 and recently archived correspondence from Tanton at
the University of Michigan indicate that he often invoked race and the
threat of Mexican immigration to white racial dominance.110
As worries over Dr. Tanton’s explicitly white nationalistic rhetoric
grew,111 Beck attempted to distance NumbersUSA from Tanton by 2002.
However, reports show continued contact and relationship between
NumbersUSA and other organizations directed by Tanton, and arms-length
coordination on state legislative efforts between more mainstream groups
and racial hate groups.112 This ostensible distancing helps NumbersUSA
serve its specific role in the entrepreneurial landscape. The organization
provides the critical legitimating mechanism for the restrictionists in
immigration discourse, channeling the racial and ethnic hostility of many of
its supporters into race-neutral, policy positions palatable to national
lawmakers.113
Although NumbersUSA had only 4,000 members in 2001,114 it swelled to
nearly 500,000 members by mid-2007, as bipartisan comprehensive

108. Jason Deparle, The Anti-Immigration Crusader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/us/17immig.html?pagewanted=all.
109. John Tanton is the Mastermind Behind the Organized Anti-Immigration Movement, S.
POVERTY LAW CTR. INTELLIGENCE REPORT: THE PUPPETEER, Vol. 106 (Summer 2002) (“The
organized anti-immigration ‘movement,’ increasingly in bed with racist hate groups, is
dominated by one man, John Tanton.”); see also INS and the Executive Office For Immigration
Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 30–38 (2001) (statement of Roy Beck, Executive Director,
NumbersUSA).
110. Deparle, supra note 108 (“‘One of my prime concerns,’ [John Tanton] wrote to a large
donor, ‘is about the decline of folks who look like you and me.’ He warned a friend that ‘for
European-American society and culture to persist requires a European-American majority, and a
clear one at that.’”).
111. Pear, supra note 96.
112. Leonard Zeskind, The New Nativism, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 23, 2005,
http://prospect.org/article/new-nativism.
113. Pear, supra note 96 (quoting Frank Sharry, executive director of the national
Immigration Forum as stating “Roy Beck takes people who are upset about illegal immigration
for different reasons, including hostility to Latino immigrants, and disciplines them so their
message is based on policy rather than race-based arguments or xenophobia”).
114. Mallie Jane Kim, After 9/11, Immigration Became About Homeland Security, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 8, 2011.
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immigration reform efforts looked increasingly likely. 115 Beck credited the
growth in membership to a few primary factors, including the events of 9/11
and the immigration stance of President Bush.116 The organization works to
stall moderate bipartisan efforts on immigration issues, even when those
proposals comport with national majoritarian preferences.
Indeed, NumbersUSA’s work was critical to derailing the 2007
comprehensive federal immigration bill, which had, at that point, received
the support of President Bush, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the hightech industry, the Catholic Church, immigrant-advocacy organizations, and
several industries reliant on immigrant labor, including farming, food
services, and construction.117 During the weeks leading up to the floor vote
on the bill, NumbersUSA coordinated weekly phone calls with the
Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, mobilized its members to
engage key senators, and provided those senators with the information and
arguments necessary to oppose the bill.118 Several actors, including proimmigrant advocates, restrictionists, and members of Congress, have
credited NumbersUSA with causing the collapse of the bill in the Senate.119
(5) Finally, media actors have played a significant role in facilitating the
work of issue entrepreneurs on immigration restriction at the national and
subnational levels. Indeed, one media personality in particular, Lou Dobbs,
played such a key role in both levels that he merits the designation as an
issue entrepreneur. Lou Dobbs Tonight on CNN promoted the cause of
immigration restriction in several ways: (1) providing sustained attention to
national and subnational manifestations between 2003 and 2009, (2) raising
the issue’s salience among activists and non-activists alike, (3) providing a
platform for restrictionists to express their views with little critical analysis
or challenge, and (4) occasionally making fundraising appeals for the legal
defense of subnational legislation.
Immigration was Dobbs’ signature issue from the very founding of Lou
Dobbs Tonight in June 2003. In the inaugural year of the show, Dobbs
covered the topic of illegal immigration in 151 of 257 shows (59%).120
During this time, he devoted about as much time to his other signature
topic: outsourcing, an issue championed more by Democrats than
115. Id.; Krissah Williams, Labor Groups, Business Seek Immigration Law Overhaul,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2007.
116. Gaouette, supra note 96.
117. Pear, supra note 96.
118. Id.
119. Gaouette, supra note 96.
120. The show was dubbed Lou Dobbs Tonight starting on June 9, 2003. We treat the
inaugural year as June 9, 2003 to June 8, 2004.
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Republicans (160 shows).121 Since then, however, immigration reigned
supreme in his program, as he covered the topic in 1,189 of 1,413 shows
(84%), while the issue of outsourcing dipped to 565 (or 49%).122 Little
surprise, then, that a Media Matters Report noted in 2008 that, “instead of
Lou Dobbs Tonight, his program might be more properly called Lou Dobbs
Crusades Against Illegal Immigration Tonight.”123
His coverage of illegal immigration focused both on national legislation
and personalities such as Jim Sensenbrenner, who introduced legislation in
2005 that would make illegal immigration and assisting illegal immigrants a
felony, but also on local groups like the Minuteman Project, which recruited
volunteers to patrol the U.S.–Mexico border.124 Dobbs also provided a
national platform for Hazleton, Pennsylvania and its then-mayor Lou
Barletta, including devoting an entire show to a town hall meeting on
immigration hosted by the city.125
Dobbs also often took on the role of an advocate, even going so far as
making fundraising appeals for the city’s attempts to defend itself against
legal challenges by the ACLU and MALDEF.126 The extent of Dobbs’
advocacy on subnational policy was perhaps most evident in the case of
Governor Eliot Spitzer’s decision to make driver licenses available to
unauthorized immigrants in New York in 2007.127 He devoted over thirty
shows to the topic, criticizing Spitzer’s proposal, inviting his guests to do
the same, and mobilizing public opposition.128 The level of mobilization was
121. Lou
Dobbs
Tonight
Transcripts,
CNN.COM,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/ldt.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
122. Id.
123. Paul Waldman et al., Fear & Loathing in Prime Time: Immigration Myths and Cable
News, MEDIA MATTERS (May 21, 2008), http://mediamattersaction.org/reports/fearand
loathing/online_version.
124. From 2004 to 2006, Sensenbrenner was covered in 119 shows, and the Minutemen
were covered in 129 shows.
125. Lou Dobbs Tonight (Fox television broadcast May 2, 2007), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/02/ldt.02.html.
126. Lou Dobbs Tonight, (Fox television broadcast May 4, 2007), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/04/ldt.01.html (urging viewers to donate funds
to subsidize Hazelton’s legal defense of its immigration ordinance).
127. Nicholas Confessore, Lou Dobbs Crusades Against Spitzer’s Driver’s License Plan for
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
10/17/nyregion/17dobbs.html.
128. Dobbs called the proposal “outrageous” on his October 29th, 2007 show. Press
Release, N.Y. State Senator John J. Flanagon, Senator Flanagon Appears on CNN’s Lou Dobbs
Tonight to Discuss Spitzer’s Licensing Policy (Oct. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.nysenate.gov/news/senator-flanagan-appears-cnn-s-lou-dobbs-tonight-discuss-spitze
r-s-licensing-policy (includes a transcript of the show).
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intense and sustained and was largely credited in forcing Spitzer to drop his
proposal, who declared, “It does not take a stethoscope to hear the pulse of
New Yorkers on this topic.”129
2.

Issue Entrepreneurs in Context

These issue entrepreneurs are notable in our Polarized Change model for
the multifarious work that they have done: they have engaged in both
federal and subfederal levels, sharpening prior conditions of party
polarization and shaping the rise of ethnic nationalism—all to advance a
restrictionist agenda that has depended both on preventing bipartisan,
moderate legislation at the national level and proliferating restrictive
legislation at the subnational level. Here, we provide illustrations of this
process from each of the last three presidential terms.
Bush First Term (2001 to 2004): The scholarship on partisanship has
noted a marked increase in polarization since 2000, after a protracted and
contentious debate over the legitimacy of the Presidential election and sharp
disagreements over tax cuts in 2001 and the prosecution of the Iraq war in
2003.130 Despite the general rise in party polarization, it was not inevitable
that legislative attempts on immigration policy since 2000 would divide
sharply along party lines and fail to pass the U.S. Congress. Indeed, Bush
was able to centralize in several areas of domestic policy that his own party
had, for many years, left to states.131 For instance, the No Child Left Behind
Act passed by overwhelming majorities in the House and Senate in 2001,132
and even contentious measures such as the 2001 tax cuts and the 2002 Iraq

129. Erika Hayasaki, Driver’s License Plan Dropped, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/15/nation/na-spitzer15.
130. GARY C. JACOBSON, A DIVIDER, NOT A UNITER: GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE: THE 2006 ELECTION AND BEYOND 1–3 (2009); Alan I. Abramowitz & Walter J. Stone,
The Bush Effect: Polarization, Turnout, and Activism in the 2004 Presidential Election, 36
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 141 (2006); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political
Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008); Geoffrey C. Layman,
Thomas M. Carsey & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American Politics:
Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83 (2006).
131. Dale Krane, The Middle Tier in American Federalism: State Government Policy
Activism During the Bush Presidency, 37 PUBLIUS (ISSUE 3), 453, 453–54 (2007).
132. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, H.R. 1, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) (passed in
the House 384–45 and Senate 91–8); see Bill Overview, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-1 (summary of congressional voting for No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001).
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War Resolution managed to draw enough bipartisan support to reach the
President.133
In the immigration context specifically, prior votes on landmark
legislation also garnered sufficient bipartisan support to pass: the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act won nearly 43% of Republican
support in the U.S. House in addition to 65% of Democrat support in the
chamber.134 Similarly, in 1996, 94% of Democrats joined 100% of
Republicans in the U.S. Senate in favor of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act.135
With the strong backing of President Bush and Senators such as Sam
Brownback (R-KS) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA), it seemed that immigration
reform might once again pass the U.S. Congress after 2000.136 Immigration
reform was high on the Bush administration’s legislative agenda in the
summer of 2001.137 Having passed a contentious and ambitious ten-year tax
reduction plan, the administration was gearing up to work on a way to
regularize the flow of migrants from Mexico and provide a path to
legalization for those already residing in the United States.138 The
administration was especially eager to show progress on this issue in
advance of the State visit of President Vicente Fox, a personal friend of the

133. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res.
114, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted) (passed in the House 296–133 and Senate 77–23); Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted)
(passed in the House 230–197 and Senate 62–38); see Resolution Overview, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hj107-114 (summary of congressional voting for
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002); Bill Overview,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-1836 (summary of
congressional voting for Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001).
134. See House Vote #872 in 1986, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
vote.xpd?vote=h1986-872 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
135. See Senate Vote #108 in 1996, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
vote.xpd?vote=s1996-108 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
136. See Marc Cooper, High Noon on the Border, THE NATION, June 6, 2005, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/high-noon-border; Kristen Lombardi, Out in the Cold,
BOSTON PHOENIX, Aug. 15–22, 2002, available at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/
boston/news_features/other_stories/multipage/documents/02425201.htm.
137. See Cooper, supra note 136.
138. Bob Kemper, U.S.-Mexico Immigration Plan Delayed, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2001),
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-01/news/0109010148_1_bush-and-foxpresident-bush-first-state-dinner; Eric Schmitt, Bush Aides Weigh Legalizing Status of Mexicans
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/15/us/bushaides-weigh-legalizing-status-of-mexicans-in-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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President, in early September.139 Even though the September 11 attacks
delayed any attempt at comprehensive immigration reform, a bipartisan
group of legislators still tried to pass smaller measures.
One such attempt was in 2002, as legislative leaders in Congress tried to
amend a seemingly obscure provision extending the grandfather period
during which eligible undocumented immigrants could apply for legal
permanent residency without leaving the United States.140 Tancredo
mounted a vigorous opposition, claiming that the bill would “invite future
terrorists to exploit lax enforcement of the immigration laws.” 141 He
succeeded in pushing for a two-thirds supermajority rule on the legislation;
FAIR lobbied wavering legislators, and NumbersUSA mobilized its grassroots supporters to maximize Republican opposition to the measure in
Congress.142 The resistance emboldened opposition in the U.S. Senate where
it subsequently stalled.143 Thus, even though the amendment had the
backing of the Bush administration, the insurgent activities of issue
entrepreneurs derailed bipartisan attempts to allow for limited adjustment of
status by pushing many moderate Republicans into the restrictionist
camp.144
139. Eric Schmitt, Two Amigos Visit Toledo and Court its Mexicans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2001,
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/07/world/two-amigos-visit-toledo-and-court-itsmexicans.html?src=pm.
140. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, H. Res. 365, 107th
Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:H.RES.365:
(proposing changes to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), regarding Adjustment of Status).
141. Section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act passed in 1994, and was
renewed in 1997 and 2000. The Bush administration pushed vigorously for the measure with the
hope of having a signed bill prior to the President’s visit to Mexico in March 2002. The
Democrats hoped to make the extension permanent. However, Congressman Tancredo used
various legislative maneuvers to force a two-thirds requirement that passed with one vote. See
Robert Pear, House Passes Immigrant Bill To Aid Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002.
142. DeParle, supra note 108 (“Numbers USA showed its force in 2002 when Republican
leaders of the House backed a bill that would have allowed some illegal immigrants to remain in
the United States while seeking legal status. Numbers USA set the phones on fire, and a
majority of Republicans opposed it. ‘I had people come up to me on the floor of the House
saying, ‘O.K., O.K., call off the dogs’—meaning Numbers USA,’ said former Representative
Tom Tancredo, a Colorado Republican who fought the bill.”).
143. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 365, 107th
Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:H.RES.365:;
ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,IMMIGRATION: ADJUSTMENT TO PERMANENT
RESIDENT
STATUS
UNDER
SECTION
245(I)
(2003),
available
at
http://congressionalresearch.com/RL31373/document.php?study=Immigration+Adjustment+to+
Permanent+Resident+Status+Under+Section+245i.
144. M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Debate on Immigration Bill in Congress Pleases Tancredo After
Years of Pushing the Issue: Littleton Republican has Ear of GOP Leadership, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Dec. 16, 2005, http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/
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Accordingly, our theory emphasizes that national legislative gridlock on
immigration matters is specifically influenced by party polarization, not just
heterogeneity and interest diffusion as it may be in other regulatory areas.145
Undoubtedly, such heterogeneity and diffusion exists in immigration law as
well; those clamoring for federal immigration laws are sometimes a strange
amalgam of interests, from immigrants’ advocacy groups to private
business interests, who either need a labor source or are trying to avoid
state-by-state regulations.146 And, the platform for national legislation is
broad, ranging from providing pathways to legalization to creating uniform
employment regulations to reconsidering admissions limitations and
enforcement priorities.147
These disparate groups have demonstrated the capacity to coalesce over
the past decade to advance federal immigration reforms. 148 Many of these
proposals enjoyed the support of national majorities and bipartisan
2005/dec/16/debate-on-immigration-bill-in-congress-pleases/ (noting the necessity of GOP
leadership taking heed of hard-line restrictionists because of the voting power of Tancredo’s
immigration caucus).
145. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 56, at 12 (“The problem [of creating national gridlock] is
not that interest groups do not represent diffuse ideological interests. Rather, the problem is that
nothing unifies these interests into coalitions capable of making policy.”). To be clear, Hills
expressly excluded immigration from his consideration, focusing instead on other regulatory
areas. Id. at 8. Our comments are orthogonal to his—not oppositional. We use this opportunity
to showcase how some of the important considerations and theories one might defend with
regards to federal legislative generally, may not neatly apply in the immigration context.
146. See Victoria DeFrancesco Soto, Strange Bedfellows in Arizona’s Recall of Russell
Pearce, DAILY GRITO, July 21, 2011, http://drvmds.com/2011/07/strange-bedfellows-inarizona%E2%80%99s-recall-of-russell-pearce/ (discussing coalition of Chamber of Commerce,
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Latinos in opposition to SB 1070 and
supporting recall of State Senator Russell Pearce).
147. See, e.g., 2012 Democratic Platform, available at http://assets.dstatic.org/dncplatform/2012-National-Platform.pdf (last accessed Sept. 14, 2012) (lauding President Obama
for securing the Mexican-American Border, streamlining the process of immigration for
relatives of citizens, for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, and enhancing
immigrant integration); 2012 Republican Platform, available at http://www.gop.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf (last accessed Sept. 14, 2012) (promoting the
granting of visas to highly-skilled immigrants, state-control in voter ID laws and immigration,
the mandatory use of e-verify, immigrant participation in the Armed Forces, and opposing
amnesty for illegal immigrants).
148. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, S. 735, 104th Cong.
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:SN00735:@@@R; Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong.
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR03734:@@@R; Ankush
Agarwal, Comment, Obstructing Justice: The Rise and Fall of the AEDPA, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 839, 850 (2004); Daniel J. Tichenor, Strange Bedfellows: The Politics and Pathologies of
Immigration Reform, 5 LAB. 39, 60 (2008).
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congressional support.149 So, despite the frailities described above, proimmigrant (or anti-regulation/enforcement) forces are capable of joining
together for sufficient periods of time to place legislation on the national
agenda, and force floor debates and votes. Yet, because it is much easier to
defeat federal legislation than to shepherd it to passage,150 focused minority
interests represented by restrictionist issue entrepreneurs have been able to
defeat those clamoring for national immigration legislation. 151 National
proposals moderate and compromise the restrictionist agenda in significant
ways, and the federal legislature provides far less opportunities for
envelope-pushing, productive entrepreneurial activity than do subfederal
forums.152
Thus, the Polarized Change model helps explain why, in the immigration
field, congressional gridlock may be even more difficult to overcome than
in other regulatory areas.153 While subject to some of the same concerns
about heterogeneity of interests and the difficulty of maintaining coalitions,
it also features activists and insiders, like Tancredo, capable of polarizing
immigration politics and stagnating federal reform, even when majority
interests coalesce.
In addition to exacerbating party polarization, issue entrepreneurs also
took advantage of the rhetorical opportunities offered by the September 11
attacks, which birthed a new form of ethnic nationalism. The post-9/11
version of ethnic nationalism championed by issue entrepreneurs moved
beyond the “culture threat” concerns articulated famously in 1991 by
conservative commentator and then-Republican presidential candidate Pat
Buchanan.154 Although the fear of cultural balkanization was still prominent
149. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, S. 735, 104th Cong.
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:SN00735:@@@R; Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong.
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR03734:@@@R.
150. Hills, supra note 56, at 12–13 (citing KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY
OF U.S. LAWMAKING 20–48 (1998) (“[B]ecause enacting federal laws requires supermajorities to
overcome presidential vetoes or senatorial filibusters, a group of interests far smaller than a
majority can block legislation.”).
151. Deparle, supra note 108; Shannon Oxley, Federation for American Immigration
Reform, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IMMIGRATION (Nov. 28, 2011), http://immigration-online.org/492federation-for-american-immigration-reform.html.
152. Hills, supra note 56, at 21 (“[I]ncumbent members of Congress may also regard
political entrepreneurship as too risky, given the specialized communities that it might offend
and the benefits of . . . cultivating the personal vote.”).
153. Id. Note that Professor Hills specifically writes outside the context of immigration law,
so our suggestions do not necessarily contradict his.
154. Clarence Page, And, Now, The Pat And David Show, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1991 (“[I]f
we had to take a million immigrants in, say Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put them in
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among immigration restrictionists after 9/11,155 the attacks introduced a new
dimension of national security to the public discourse on immigration
restriction.
With national security considerations adding a level of legitimacy and
plausible deniability to the role of racial antipathy in nativist sentiment,
issue entrepreneurs made sure to invoke this dimension frequently in their
opposition to immigration. They frequently lumped illegal immigrants
together with terrorists in discussions ranging from the U.S.–Mexico border
crossing156 to the attempt by states to grant drivers licenses to unauthorized
immigrants.157 Indeed, as Professor Jennifer Chacon has noted, the term
“border security” emerged only after 9/11, as prior discussions of “border
control” took on military metaphors and subsumed concerns about
homeland security and terrorism.158 The conflation of terrorism and illegal
immigration, in turn, had a chilling effect on legislative attempts at the
national or subnational levels that were perceived as being “soft” on illegal
immigrants. As James Carafano, a homeland security expert at the
conservative Heritage Foundation noted: “the connection between
immigration and terrorism in policy discussions did make it more difficult
to have a rational debate with some people, who could just throw in
terrorism and halt the conversation.”159
Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people
of Virginia?”).
155. See Samuel Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2004,
30 (“The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two
peoples, two cultures, and two languages.”).
156. See J.D. HAYWORTH WITH JOSEPH J. EULE, WHATEVER IT TAKES: ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). [BB R 15]
157. CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight frequently made the linkages between state drivers licenses
to illegal immigrants and terrorist threats to homeland security. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight
(CNN television broadcast Oct 17, 2007), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0710/
17/ldt.01.html (“The governor . . . will make it easier for law breakers of all sorts—including
terrorists—to take advantage of New York State's driver's license . . . .”).
158. Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1853 (2007) (“[R]emovals of noncitizens . . .
can be, and frequently are, depicted as national security policy. With regard to border
enforcement efforts, the phrase ‘border security’ has become a ubiquitous descriptive term . . .
.”).
159. Mallie Jane Kim, After 9/11, Immigration Became About Homeland Security, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/09/08/after911-immigration-became-about-homeland-security-attacks-shifted-the-conversation-heavilytoward-terrorism-and-enforcement; cf. Linda Bosniak, ‘Nativism’ the Concept: Some
Reflections, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! 279 (Juan Perea ed., 1996) (arguing that the word “nativism”
is not as important for what it means as what it does; that is, it delegitimizes points of view and
takes them out of the bounds of rational debate).
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This invocation of security tropes, combined with an almost exclusive
focus on unwanted migration from the southern border, situates the
proliferation of subnational immigration regulation within the historical
narrative of the past decade, showing how 9/11 changed the discourse of
immigration, providing issue entrepreneurs with the necessary language to
covertly indulge the racial and cultural prejudices of a portion of the
citizenry. Further, it showcases the precise mechanism by which nebulous
racial and cultural concerns can be exploited within political factions to
produce immigration policy.
Scholars like Michael Wishnie have long maintained that devolved
immigration decision-making will lead to increased bigotry.160 Recent
findings by the Department of Justice regarding local immigration
enforcement in Arizona support his contention.161 Racial profiling and
disparate enforcement seem to inevitably result when states and localities
attempt to enforce immigration (although, one might worry about the racial
disparity in immigration enforcement generally, regardless of whether
federal or subfederal entities engage in it162). Missing from these important
explorations of the effects of subnational immigration regulation is an
account of how ethnic nationalism and racial prejudice work to produce
state and local regulation in the first instance.
To fill that void, the Polarized Change model shows how restrictionist
issue entrepreneurs effectively take advantage of latent racial prejudice to
build party and local majority support for immigration legislation. Through
the prism of national security and homeland sanctity, entrepreneurs have
successfully moved explicit racial and cultural reasons for restriction from
the fringe of political discussion to the mainstream. The racialized
component of homeland security discourse is evidenced by the focus on
160. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 553 (2001) (arguing that devolution
of immigrant-related lawmaking power to the states would “erode the antidiscrimination and
anticaste principles that are at the heart of our Constitution”).
161. Letter Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., to Mr. Bill
Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney for Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. (Dec. 15, 2011) (discussing the United
States’ Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office: “[b]ased upon our extensive
investigation, we find reasonable cause to believe that [the sheriff’s office] engages in a pattern
or practice of unconstitutional policing. Specifically, we find that [the sheriff’s office] . . .
engages in racial profiling of Latinos; unlawfully stops, detains, and arrests Latinos”).
162. Federal law maintained racial barriers to naturalization, excluded based on national
and racial origin, and recently called for special registration of certain middle-eastern migrants
through its NSEERS program—a program architected, in part, by Kris Kobach, one of the
immigration issue entrepreneurs we identify, during his stint with the Department of Justice. See
generally Huntington, supra note 9.
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Mexican migrants and the southern border and the use of explicitly
racialized rhetoric to drum up support for restrictionist policies. In sum, the
Polarized Change model incorporates and explains the role of ethnic
nationalism and racial prejudice in the genesis—and not just the result—of
subnational immigration law.
Finally, from 2001 through 2004, issue entrepreneurs were working at
both federal and subfederal levels. Even before state legislative efforts at
immigration restriction were making national headlines in 2006, groups
such as FAIR were getting involved in subnational efforts to restrict
immigration. For example, during the summer of 2001, the organization
played a supportive role in advising local activists in Iowa who were
mobilizing against Governor Tom Vilsack’s Model Cities program to create
“immigration enterprise zones” to address the state’s chronic labor
shortages.163 Also, as we noted in the prior section, FAIR gathered
signatures for Arizona’s restrictionist Proposition 200 in 2004 and filed
lawsuits after the measure’s passage to ensure its broadest application.164
Bush Second Term (2005 to 2008): Soon after the 2004 election, the
Bush administration again made comprehensive immigration reform a
policy priority, encouraging renewed efforts at bipartisan legislation.165 At
the same time, the President’s standing within the Republican Party was
diminished considerably. Not only was Bush a lame-duck party leader
whose Vice-President had forsworn any plans to run in 2008, he also lost
considerable standing among conservative activists who were frustrated
with the administration’s failure to rein in government spending166 and its
inability to privatize aspects of Social Security in early 2005.167

163. William Claiborne, Immigration Foes Find Platform in Iowa; National Groups Fight
Governor on Recruiting Workers From Abroad, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2001,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28131-2001Aug18.html.
164. See, e.g., Yes on Proposition 200 v. Napolitano, 215 Ariz. 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
165. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON
PERMANENT ADDMISSIONS (2006); Hugh Dellios, Immigration Tops Summit Agenda, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 30, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-03-30/news/0603300239_1_illegalimmigration-immigration-reform-bush-and-fox.
166. The increase in spending under the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Modernization
Act was particularly galling to many conservative leaders and activists in the Republican Party.
Craig Shirley & Donald Devine, Karl Rove Is No Conservative, as His Memoir Shows, WASH.
POST, Apr. 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/31/AR2
010033102630.html.
167. Rachel Morris, Borderline Catastrophe: How the Fight Over Immigration Blew up
Rove’s Big Tent, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2006, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/
2006/0610.morris.html.
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Thus, issue entrepreneurs such as Tom Tancredo (R-CO) and
NumbersUSA found it much easier to mobilize Republican Party activists
and elected officials towards a more restrictive position. Making effective
use of conservative talk radio and constituent pressure, they thinned the
ranks of Republican moderates on immigration, making the parties more
polarized on the issue than they would have been otherwise.168 This was
perhaps most evident in the case of Jim Sensenbrenner’s (R-WI), who
spearheaded an enforcement-only measure in 2005, although he previously
supported legislation such as the § 245(i) provision Tancredo opposed in
2001 and 2002.169
The exacerbation of party polarization by issue entrepreneurs continued
through 2007, when Comprehensive Immigration Reform legislation had
majority support in both chambers of Congress, but failed to overcome the
Senate filibuster, as restrictionist organizations put enormous pressure on
moderate Republicans to prevent cloture. As the New York Times reported:
The big war broke out in 2007, after Mr. Bush proposed a
systemic overhaul including a path to citizenship for most illegal
immigrants . . . .
FAIR rallied talk show hosts. The Center for Immigration Studies
churned out studies of the bill’s perceived flaws. Numbers USA
jammed the Capitol’s phones.
Their success became the stuff of lore. They “lit up the
switchboard for weeks,” said Senator Mitch McConnell of
Kentucky, the Republican leader, explaining his decision to
oppose the bill. “And to every one of them, I say today: ‘Your
voice was heard.’ ”170

This covert and overt multilevel work in derailing federal immigration
law has largely gone unexamined because restrictionist issue entrepreneurs
do not concurrently advance an alternate comprehensive, legislative

168. Interview with Angela Kelley, Former Deputy Dir. of the Nat’l Immigration Forum
(Feb. 2011) (notes on file with author).
169. Press Release, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Rep. Gekas Introduces Compromise Immigration 245(i) Extension Legislation; Sensenbrenner
Supports Expedited House Consideration Next Week (May 17, 2001) (Sensenbrenner called
245(i) a “fair piece of compromise legislation that deserves passage. I believe this legislation
strengthens families without unintentionally encouraging people to break the law . . . .”).
170. Deparle, supra note 108.
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solution.171 Indeed, groups such as FAIR consider “comprehensive
immigration reform” simply a code for amnesty and see maximal
enforcement as the only acceptable solution.172 Thus, restrictionist issue
entrepreneurs are focused mainly on forestalling bipartisan Congressional
action that would moderate hard-line restrictionist goals. Relatedly, they do
not attract the attention that a special interest group garners when it seeks
concentrated fiscal gains or private benefits.173 Because they work at
multiple levels, they can utilize congressional delay to build subnational
momentum towards a more restrictionist national stance.174 Moreover, issue
entrepreneurs have been successful in securing federal concessions through
quieter avenues than congressional legislation.175 Thus, even in the absence
of federal legislative solutions that could preempt their subfederal policies
and increase public scrutiny, issue entrepreneurs have been able to secure
favorable federal action in an enforcement-only direction.
Under these background conditions, restrictionist issue entrepreneurs
instead (a) engender federal legislative gridlock, (b) squeeze substantial
political mileage out of complaining about that specific type of federal
inaction, and then (c) fill that legislative vacuum by proliferating subfederal
immigration laws that feature uncompromised versions of their restrictionist
agenda. The Supreme Court, in Chy Lung v. Freeman,176 gestured that

171. We note, however, that there have been some federal legislative efforts championed by
issue entrepreneurs. Some, like the Secure Fences Act of 2006, were successful. Others, like the
CLEAR Act were not.
172. Federation for American Immigration Reform, The Push for Amnesty for Illegal Aliens
(2010), available at http://www.fairus.org/issue/the-push-for-amnesty-for-illegal-aliens. (“[O]f
the three legs of the stool [enforcement, improved legal flows, path to legalization], only one leg
— law enforcement — makes sense and has broad public support.”).
173. See Hills, supra note 56, at 10–11 (citing Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342 (1990) (describing holdups to federal legislation, including
“Madison’s Nightmare” of majority inaction enabling minority dominance and problems of
collective action)).
174. See Press Release, Mitt Romney, Mitt Romney Announces Support of Kansas
Secretary of State Kris Kobach (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=99028. In its current and recent versions, comprehensive federal immigration
reform proposals feature items anathema to the restrictionist vision, like the DREAM Act and
increased legal immigration. Federation for American Immigration Reform, FAIR Applauds
Senate Defeat of the “Recurring” DREAM Act Amnesty, PRNEWSWIRE (Oct. 24, 2007),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fair-applauds-senate-defeat-of-the-recurring-dreamact-amnesty-58904982.html.
175. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing Obama Administration’s enforcement heavy
concessions).
176. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
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federal inaction builds the necessary constitutional narrative177 for
subfederal involvement in immigration. Issue entrepreneurs limit the idea of
“federal inaction” to recent congressional inaction,178 and they use this
frame to instantiate their policy goals at the local and state levels and build
momentum towards a new legal and political norm for immigration
enforcement.
With respect to ethnic nationalism, issue entrepreneurs such as Lou
Dobbs tried different ways to cast Latin American immigrants as a security
threat.179 With concerns over terrorist threats becoming less salient over
time, and economic anxiety not yet on the horizon, aspects of immigrant
criminality suddenly seemed very salient. Thus, for instance, elected
representatives such as Lou Barletta from Hazleton and Russell Pearce from
Arizona justified their restrictionist efforts by claiming a rise in violent
crime among Mexican immigrant residents and the possibility of
clandestine cross-border arms networks.180 Law enforcement officials such
as Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio affirmed such claims.181 Finally, media
personalities such as Lou Dobbs amplified the anxiety by running stories on
immigrants and crime, suggesting that gangs of illegal immigrants from
Latin America were prompting a rash of new crimes in the country.182
These claims mostly did not stand up to empirical scrutiny: while the
isolated stories about particular crimes involving Latin American
immigrants were not false, the idea of widespread immigrant criminality
was belied by evidence. In fact, scholarly study indicated the contrary;

177. Id. at 280 (“We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a
State in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect herself by . . . laws against paupers
and convicted criminals from abroad . . . .”); Huntington, supra note 9, at 821 (noting the
significance of this language from Chy Lung, specifically its seeming invitation to state
immigration regulation in times of federal inaction).
178. We explain the marginalizing of the role of the federal executive defining federal
policy below. See infra Part III.B.1.
179. See Waldman et al., supra note 123.
180. Mariano Castillo, Crime Stats Test Rationale Behind Arizona Immigration Law, CNN,
Apr. 29, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-29/justice/arizona.immigration.crime_1_senrussell-pearce-illegal-immigration-immigration-law?_s=PM:CRIME; Janet Klein, Welcome to
Hazleton, CBS News (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_1622195789.html.
181. Andrea Nill Sanchez, Sheriff Joe Arpaio: We Should Send Troops to Mexico, THINK
PROGRESS (Mar. 16, 2010), http://thinkprogress.org/security/2010/03/16/175949/arpaio-troopsmexico/ (referring to Arpaio’s appearance on MSNBC News Live on March 16, 2010 where he
noted that the U.S. government should “send the troops into Mexico” to address violence due to
illegal immigration).
182. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (Fox Business Network October 5, 2006).
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immigrants committed fewer crimes than native-borns183 and immigrantheavy cities like Houston and states like Arizona were actually facing
significant declines in violent crime.184
As Professor Carpenter argues, legislative epidemics are most likely
when the entrepreneurs’ message is especially sticky.185 Undoubtedly, the
trope of immigrant criminality is not new to issue entrepreneurs or this last
decade of immigration discourse. The message of immigrant and foreign
threat to domestic prosperity, security, and cultural values is a long-held and
deeply-ingrained trope in American political and legal history. 186 It is so
entrenched in the American political imagination that it resists empirical
refutation.187 Despite data from economists and sociologists showcasing
national welfare gains from more liberal migration laws188 and the lack of
183. Eyal Press, Do Immigrants Make Us Safer?, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Dec. 3, 2006;
Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the The Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment
Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (June
2006). Crime data by nativity or race is not available for the vast majority of (small)
municipalities and counties in the United States, and thus cannot be incorporated into our
analysis of local ordinances in Part I.
184. Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2010 (“[T]he rate of violent crime at the border, and indeed across Arizona, has
been declining, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”).
185. Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws
that Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 21–25 (2010) (describing the use of sticky
messages to successfully “market” criminal legislation).
186. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The New Politics of Immigration: “Balanced-Budget
Conservatism” and the Symbolism of Proposition 187, 43 SOC. PROBS. 284 (1996); Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit of Cultural Cohesion, 77
U. CIN. L. REV. 1441 (2009) (arguing that anti-immigrant regulations impossibly and
impermissibly attempt to protect perceived cultural values and commonalities); Criminal Aliens,
FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/criminal-aliens; Ruben G.
Rumbaut et al., Debunking the The Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among Firstand Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (June 2006), available
at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=403.
187. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1710 (2011) (“Although other studies have found
that illegal immigration significantly benefits state budgets . . . . Roughly three-quarters of
Americans believe unauthorized immigrants harm the economy . . . .”).
188. See Howard F. Chang, The Disadvantages of Immigration Restriction as a Policy to
Improve Income Distribution, 61 SMU L. REV. 23 (2008); Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62090/tamarjacoby/immigration-nation. Note that we acknowledge findings that suggest some short-term
economic losses concentrated at the local level (from medical care and other local public
services). However, even accounting for those potential losses, evidence overwhelmingly shows
the net welfare gains from more increased immigration. Further, the objection of concentrated
local losses could always be addressed through cross-subsidization schemes whereby federal
windfalls could be distributed to specifically affected municipalities.
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correlation between immigration and crime,189 public perception about the
negative impact of increased migration remains largely unchanged.190
What is innovative about issue entrepreneurs in this specific time period,
however, are the connections they drew between the purported immigrant
criminality, homeland security, and subnational immigration policy. They
successfully blamed so-called sanctuary cities for facilitating and sheltering
dangerous immigrant criminals and illegal immigrant gangs.191 Conversely,
if certain cities’ lenient policies were in part responsible for the flourishing
of immigrant criminal activity, then the corollary must be true: states and
cities could and should be part of the solution, thereby justifying local
police participation in immigration enforcement. Protecting domestic
security in a post-9/11 world, then, was not just about national border
control; it also required the elimination of sanctuary cities and the increased
participation of states and cities in criminalizing illegal immigration and
enforcing immigration law.
Enter Kris Kobach. While entrepreneurs, media personalities, and
elected officials were making the rhetorical case for the necessity of state
and local solutions, Kobach designed legislation for localities, using his
background in constitutional law to ensure a colorable legal basis for his
proposals.192 On July 13, 2006, Hazleton, Pennsylvania enacted a Kobachauthored law, in a well-publicized, real-life instantiation of this theory of
state and local control.193 A scant four days later, on July 17, 2006, the city
189. Rumbaut et al., supra note 66.
190. Ruy Teixeira, Public Opinion Watch, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 5,
2006), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/04/b1531059.html.
For example, in the most recent Time poll, 68 percent said illegal
immigration was a very or extremely serious problem and, in a just-released
Pew poll on immigration (PDF), 74 percent termed immigration at very big
or moderately big problem, up from 69 percent in 2002. In the same Pew
poll, 52 percent now say that “immigrants today are a burden on our country
because they take our jobs, housing and health care” (up from 38 percent in
2000), compared to 41 percent who say ”immigrants today strengthen our
country because of their hard work and talents” (down from 50 percent in
2000).
Id.
191. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Oct. 5, 2006) (transcript
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0610/05/ldt.01.html).
192. Leah Nelson et al., When Mr. Kobach Comes to Town: Nativist Laws and the
Communities They Damage, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/when-mr-kobach-comes-to-town.
193. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10 (July 13, 2006), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0003.pdf; see also Nelson et al.,
supra note 192.
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of Valley Park, Missouri enacted a similar ordinance, also authored by
Kobach, targeting landlords and local employers.194 From that point, with
significant media coverage focused on those and similar enactments,
subnational immigration lawmaking gained significant momentum.195 In our
analysis of data from the National Council of State Legislatures, the most
significant spike in restrictive state legislation also occurred during this
time, more than tripling from 2005 to 2006 (from fifteen to fourty-nine),
and then doubling in 2007 (to ninety-eight laws enacted). Again, it is worth
recalling that this surge occurred during a national economic boom, with
low unemployment.
Obama First Term (2009 to 2012): During the Bush Presidency, issue
entrepreneurs built their organizations and began organizing their multilevel
strategy. In the early part of the decade, they took advantage of a post-9/11
context, which allowed them to conflate terrorism and immigration
concerns and increase party polarization, which allowed them to solidify a
restrictionist stance as a lame-duck President’s influence within his party
waned.196 By the time Obama began his Presidency, issue entrepreneurs
were riding the strong momentum of their victory in derailing 2007
bipartisan federal reform and the enactment of several high-profile
subfederal laws, like the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2008 and Hazletontype laws in places as far flung as Farmers Branch, Texas and Riverside,
New Jersey.197 During the past four years, issue entrepreneurs have grown
prominent and entrenched, and their work has become systematized and
evident.
While party polarization has generally stalled many initiatives at the
federal level, Obama was successful in mobilizing federal legislative
majorities to end “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and to pass a federal health care
overhaul. Despite being able to herd enough votes to pass health care
legislation—an area of traditional state dominance with strong libertarian
194. Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark_ordinance.pdf; see also Nelson et al.,
supra note 192.
195. Aaron Couch, State Illegal Immigration Laws: What Have They Accomplished?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/
0323/State-illegal-immigration-laws-What-have-they-accomplished.
196. Joe Klein, Bush’s Last Days: The Lamest Duck, TIME MAG. (Nov. 26, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1862464,00.html.
197. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -216 (2008); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance
2903 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at https://www.farmersbranch.info/sites/default/files/Ordinance
%20No%202903.pdf, invalidated by Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577
F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-16 (July 26, 2006),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/riverside_firstordinance.pdf.
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valences—the Obama administration has been unable to make any progress
on immigration, an area traditionally relegated to federal control. 198 Indeed,
in late 2010, Congress was unable to pass the DREAM Act, one of the most
popular individual pieces of the 2007 comprehensive reform package (and
even now a measure with broad public support).199 In a coordinated effort,
FAIR and NumbersUSA, along with the Center for Immigration Studies,
ensured that the DREAM Act proposal would not survive a Senate
filibuster. Completing the project begun in 2001, issue entrepreneurs’
exacerbation of party polarization on immigration meant that by the 2010
DREAM Act vote, no moderate Republicans remained to help break the
filibuster and effectuate national majoritarian preferences.200
While that federal legislative effort stalled, border security and enhanced
enforcement by the Department of Homeland Security continue. In efforts
to bring enough Republicans (sufficient to break the filibuster) to the
negotiating table on the DREAM Act or other immigration reforms, the
President used his executive power to make enforcement concessions that
angered his own party’s base but that were also seemingly designed to bring
polarized restrictionists to the negotiating table and begin bipartisan reform.
198. E.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (“The passage of laws which
concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to
Congress, and not to the States.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941) (“That the
supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over
immigration, naturalization and deportation, . . . has . . . been given continuous recognition by
this Court.”).
199. Public Support for the Dream Act, FIRST FOCUS (June 2010),
http://www.firstfocus.net/sites/default/files/dreampollbreakdown_0.pdf.
200. Professor Roderick Hills, analyzing the role of policy advocates in mobilizing federal
action, compared such advocates to surfers, who “wait for the right wave of problems and
politics before [they] can move.” Hills, supra note 56, at 20. While it remains true, as Hills
notes, that these entrepreneurs rely on the “right opportunities and incentives”—that is, in our
framework, the right partisan conditions—we introduce a slight twist on his conception. Id. We
envision an active and deliberative role for the restrictionist issue entrepreneur, in creating
opportunities and incentives. In our conception, congressional inaction does not cause the
immigration entrepreneur to spring into action; rather, the entrepreneur presses for a national
legislative stalemate when proposed federal policy is unlikely to yield all the outcomes desired
by restrictionists. This may be especially true at this moment in jurisprudential history, given
the Court’s recent turn against campaign finance regulation. At least one scholar predicts that
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), is a boon to issue entrepreneurs,
easing the funding of their campaigns. See Orbach et. al., supra note 45, at 1167. Thus, we
might predict that entrepreneurs will now exponentially enhance their power and funding with
each minor success. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42 , at 714 (noting that the phenomenon of
an availability cascade feeds on itself, and that once successful, availability entrepreneurs will
command greater resources); Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1169 (arguing that private
lawmakers’ power and funding increase with each city that clones or enacts a suggested law).

1478

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

For example, President Obama used his executive power to order National
Guard troops to the border, and his administration has been deporting
immigrants at record rates.201 These executive concessions, however, have
not succeeded in breaking the hold of issue entrepreneurs over the number
of lawmakers necessary to overcome a filibuster and enact immigration
reform or popular parts of such reform.
Stepped up national enforcement, moreover, has not mollified
restrictionist critics, either at organizations such as NumbersUSA or among
conservative media personalities. With the departure of Dobbs from CNN in
2009, groups such as FAIR now rely more heavily on conservative talk
radio hosts and special events such as the annual “Hold their Feet to the
Fire” conference in Washington, D.C., where the organization brings
together dozens of conservative radio hosts to focus on illegal immigration
and immigration enforcement, combined with rallies, visits to wavering
legislators, and guest appearances by sympathetic members of Congress.202
As the New York Times noted, such events allow FAIR to maintain its own
race-neutrality while its associates are free to invoke ethnic nationalist
frames: “This year’s event mixed discussion of job losses among minorities
with calls to use Tomahawk missiles on Tijuana drug lords, while a doubter
of President Obama’s birth certificate referred to ‘the undocumented
worker’ in the White House.”203 And concerns about national security and
sovereignty continue to remain salient, as prominent radio personalities
such as Roger Hedgecock continue to press the notion that Mexican drug
cartels control vast portions of the Southwest.204
Meanwhile, subnational legislative activity continues unabated, most
notably at the state level. Even as the Department of Justice sues to enjoin
one enactment, issue entrepreneurs create others, each one subject to federal
challenge, and each consuming federal prosecutorial and judicial resources.
Moreover, each subsequent enactment appears to expand the boundaries of
201. Peter Slevin, Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Increases Under Obama
Administration, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/25/AR2010072501790.html?sid=ST2010082704452.
202. Pamela Constable & N.C. Aizenman, Rally Against Illegal Immigration Scheduled,
WASH. POST, April 22, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/04/21/AR2007042101213.html.
203. Jason DeParle, The Anti-Immigration Crusader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/us/17immig.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
204. Roger Hedgecock, Mexican Drug Cartels Control Parts of Arizona, HUMAN EVENTS
(June 18, 2010, 3:01 AM), http://www.humanevents.com/2010/06/18/mexican-drug-cartelscontrol-parts-of-arizona/ (“Think about it. A part of America is off limits to U.S. citizens
because it is now controlled by an army of foreigners.”).
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state and local enforcement activities, adding increasingly punitive policies
with each step. Discussing a provision of the Alabama law he authored,
Kobach noted a new provision that made the state “the first . . . to invalidate
all contracts entered into with illegal immigrants. A strict reading of the law
could mean that any contract, including mortgages, apartment leases and
basic work agreements, can be ruled null and void.”205 Importantly, Kobach
has also pushed back against national efforts to enshrine restrictive
measures such as E-Verify in 2012, arguing that such bills would “establish
a fairly toothless E-Verify requirement while defanging the only
government bodies that are serious about enforcing immigration law — the
states.”206
While expanding the scope of subnational laws with each enactment,
entrepreneurial strategy has also matured and systematized with regard to
venue selection. Prospectively, the Polarized Change model utilizes the
mechanics of the decentralized and federated party system to unlock the
predictive power of party polarization. While party polarization helps issue
entrepreneurs advance their policy positions and keep immigration
restriction high on the party agenda, it concurrently allows observers to
predict where the entrepreneurs are likely to strike next. As our data
showcases, rather than look to areas of significant demographic or
economic change, issue entrepreneurs are more likely to look to areas of
Republican party domination with enterprising candidates and officials,
regardless of the underlying demographic factors.207 Thus, for instance, the
November 2011 switch of the Mississippi House of Representatives from
Democrat to Republican for the first time since Reconstruction has meant
that the House will no longer be able to bottle up legislation in committees
controlled by Democrats.208 Notably, Mississippi ranks as the third-lowest
205. Alan Gomez, States Make Daily Life Harder for Illegal Immigrants, USA TODAY,
Dec.
20,
2011,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-12-20/illegalimmigrants-contracts-void/52132602/1 (Kobach continued by noting that the provision could
have “much greater effect than some people might expect at first glance”).
206. Kris W. Kobach, Another Amnesty? New Bill Hobbles Border States, N.Y. POST, June
15,
2011,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/another_amnesty_
LauPhaZnaURz3fUcpXAphK.
207. See North Carolina Could be Next to Pass Statewide Immigration Law, NUMBERSUSA
(Dec. 9, 2011, 01:22 PM), http://www.numbersusa.com/content/news/december-9-2011/northcarolina-could-be-next-pass-state-wide-immigration-law.html.
208. Jeff Amy, GOP Takes Miss. House for 1st Time in Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14,
2011, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2011/11/14/gop_takes_miss_hou
se_for_1st_time_in_years/. In February 2012, the Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance noted
that “with the Republicans in charge now for the first time . . . . [w]e expect many antiimmigrant bills to come from that chamber . . . .” Mississippi Immigrant Rights Alliance,
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state in terms of immigrant share of the resident population (two percent of
the total population in 2010), and this grew from about 1.5 percent of the
population in 2000.209 Finally, even in states with more sizable new
immigrant populations, such as North Carolina, partisan dynamics seem to
be of paramount importance. As NumbersUSA reported on the conditions in
North Carolina for its State and Local alert: “with Republicans now in
control of the state legislature in North Carolina, efforts have begun to pass
similar, statewide legislation to crack down on illegal immigration.”210
Meanwhile, the major judicial development of the last four years was the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States,211 in which the Obama
Justice Department sued to enjoin the state’s immigration enforcement
scheme.212 The Court struck down three of the four provisions at issue, but
preserved, for the time being, the provision directing local police to check
the immigration status of suspected individuals.213 Both majority and
dissenting opinions in Arizona are notable for their adoption of the narrative
of issue entrepreneurs—of state and local pressure in the wake of federal
impotence. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion sympathized with the state’s
purported immigration woes, stating “[t]he pervasiveness of federal
regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the
States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful
immigration.”214 Justice Scalia’s dissent made specific factual claims, with
no evidentiary citation:
Arizona bears the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration
problem. Its citizens feel themselves under siege by large numbers
of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social
services, and even place their lives in jeopardy. Federal officials
have been unable to remedy the problem, and indeed have recently
shown that they are unwilling to do so.215
Mississippi Republicans Up to No Good, IMMIGRATION PROF. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2012/02/mississippi-republicans-up-to-no-good.h
tml.
209. See Mississippi QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28000.html (last updated Sept. 18, 2012); Source:
Mississippi Fact Sheet, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/
state.cfm?ID=ms (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
210. NUMBERSUSA, supra note 207.
211. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
212. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).
213. Id. at 2510.
214. Id. at 2500.
215. Id. at 2522 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Richard A. Posner, Justice Scalia is Upset
about Illegal Immigration, But Where is His Evidence?, SLATE MAG. (June 27, 2012),
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Thus, the true measure of entrepreneurial success in Arizona may not be the
salvaging of one of its enforcement provisions but rather the Supreme Court
accepting the narrative that state and local immigration laws are necessary
to “fix” federal failures.
The Court’s preservation of the so-called “show me your papers”
provision emboldened Arizona officials, as well as those in other states who
have either passed or are considering state immigration enforcement bills. 216
They appear to have read Arizona as a victory for state and local
immigration regulation, rejuvenating their restrictionist stances, as
Alabama’s attorney general remarked, “[t]oday the Supreme Court
acknowledged that state law enforcement can play an important role in
assisting the federal government in fulfilling its responsibility to enforce
[federal immigration law].”217
While it remains to be seen whether these types of statements are mere
rhetoric in the face of a disappointing result for restrictionists, states and
localities are still left with significant room to maneuver after Arizona. First,
among SB 1070’s provisions that were not presented for Court review—and
are therefore good law in the state—are the law’s purpose statement and its
statewide preemption of local sanctuary ordinances.218 Importantly, SB
1070’s statement of purpose announces “attrition through enforcement” as
the state’s explicit goal, and its survival is at least symbolically significant
for subfederal immigration involvement. Second, Arizona’s injunction of
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2012/_supreme_c
ourt_year_in_review/supreme_court_year_in_review_justice_scalia_offers_no_evidence_to_ba
ck_up_his_claims_about_illegal_immigration_.html (“But the suggestion that illegal
immigrants in Arizona are invading Americans’ property, straining their social services, and
even placing their lives in jeopardy is sufficiently inflammatory to call for a citation to some
reputable source of such hyperbole. Justice Scalia cites nothing to support it.”).
216. Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Arizona Immigration Law: Gov. Jan Brewer Claims
Victory, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 25, 2012, http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics
/articles/2012/06/25/20120625arizona-immigration-law-gov-jan-brewer-claims-victory.html
(quoting Gov. Brewer’s declaration that the Supreme Court upheld the “heart of the law”);
Valerie Richardson, Arizona’s AG: Court’s Ruling is ‘a 70% win’, WASH. TIMES, June 25,
2012,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/25/arizonas-ag-courts-ruling-is-a-70win/?page=all.
217. Jorge Rivas, Ala. Attorney General Luther Strange Reacts to SCOTUS SB 1070
Ruling, COLORLINES (June 25, 2012), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/06/ala_attorney_
general_luther_strange_responds_to_scotus_sb_1070_ruling.html.
218. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010), available at
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf (“[T]he intent of this act is to make
attrition through enforcement the public policy of . . . Arizona.”); id. at § 2A (“No official or
agency of this state or a county, city, town . . . may . . . [limit or restrict] the enforcement of
federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law.”).
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three of SB 1070’s provisions does not resolve the constitutionality of the
other types of state enforcement provisions at issue in other state and local
enactments. For example, it remains unclear whether localities can enact
rental ordinances219 or whether Alabama’s provision invalidating contracts
entered into by unauthorized immigrants or its law collecting immigration
status information at public schools are constitutional.220 It would take at
least another Supreme Court case to address, let alone resolve, those
outstanding attempts at state and local immigration regulation.
Finally, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Arizona not only relied on
empirically unsound claims, it was also conspicuously political. 221 In a few
paragraphs, Scalia criticized President Obama’s decision to defer
prosecution of certain young, law-abiding undocumented students as an
“unwise” use of federal funds.222 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
described Scalia’s critique as “fighting words” and “inflammatory,” noting
that the Administration’s program was announced after Arizona was argued
and appears nowhere in the record of the case.223 The exchange suggests
that the politicized nature of immigration policy proliferation may be
extending even further than Congress and state and local legislative bodies
to the U.S. Supreme Court itself.
To summarize, during the Obama Presidency, we witnessed the fruition
of the entrepreneurial vision: engendered gridlock at the national level at
key moments of potential bipartisan compromise, providing the rhetorical
hook and policy vacuum necessary to proliferate state and local legislation.
This legislative landscape has become so normalized that Presidential
hopeful Mitt Romney promised that his putative administration would
“support states like South Carolina and Arizona that are stepping forward to
address this problem [of illegal immigration].”224 Far from the 2000–2001
219. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), judgment vacated on other
grounds sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The U.S. Supreme
Court forestalled a final decision on the case by remanding it to the federal appeals court for
consideration in light of the Court’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 1968 (2011).
220. H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 8, 27, 28 (Ala. 2011), available at
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/searchableinstruments/2011rs/bills/hb56.htm.
221. See Posner, supra note 215 (Judge Posner criticizing Justice Scalia’s opinion: “It
wouldn’t surprise me if Justice Scalia’s opinion were quoted in campaign ads. The program that
appalls Justice Scalia was announced almost two months after the oral argument in the Arizona
case. It seems rather a belated development to figure in an opinion in the case.”).
222. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. Posner, supra note 215.
224. Press Release, Mitt Romney, Mitt Romney Announces Support of Kansas Secretary of
State Kris Kobach (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=99028.
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Bush platform of bipartisan federal reform, focused on meeting labor needs
and increasing legal immigration, this new vision imagines states and
localities as the primary bulwarks against a flood of unauthorized
immigration to the United States.
III.

A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF POLARIZED
CHANGE

Our purpose in this paper has been to foreground the politicized nature of
immigration policy and to provide a thick description of the mechanism
fomenting both state and local policy proliferation, and federal policy
stagnation. This description, based on extensive quantitative and qualitative
investigation, lays the groundwork for a fundamental rethinking of the
current judicial and scholarly appraisals of this recent spate of state and
local immigration regulation. We leave that task for a future project,225 but
we briefly note some of those implications.
Because restrictionist issue entrepreneurs appear to be engaging a
strategy of judicial, rather than congressional, engagement, the Polarized
Change model challenges some of the basic tenets of federalism analysis.
When state and local policy proliferation is motivated by political, rather
than regional demographic challenges, the purported values of decentralized
decisionmaking are highly compromised. In short, states and localities cease
to be idealized “laboratories” of policy experimentation and fail to produce
instructive responses to demographic problems.226 Rather, by highlighting
the salience of ethnic nationalism, the polarized change model suggests that
courts should consider equality-based, as opposed to structural power,
frameworks to evaluate the constitutionality of state and local immigration
laws.
More globally, both courts and commentators must abandon functionalist
explanations of state and local immigration regulation. While scholars have
carved out important normative space for state and local immigrant efforts
to integrate immigrants, they have done so by adopting the unsupported
demographic assumptions popularized by issue entrepreneurs. Moreover,
Polarized Change challenges “steam-valve” theories of immigration
federalism which maintain that isolated subfederal enactments are desirable
because they dissipate restrictionist or anti-immigrant sentiment at the local
225. Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, The New Immigration Federalism (awaiting
submission) (forthcoming 2013)
226. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 187, at 1673.
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level, thereby relieving the pressure to enact those laws at the federal level.
Polarized Change, however, suggests that proliferating policies in
politically receptive subfederal jurisdictions builds, rather than dissipates,
pressure for restrictive action at the federal level and, more generally,
enshrines a more restrictionist status quo. These critical developments
require extensive and detailed analysis, which we pursue elsewhere.
For the better part of the last decade, states and localities have markedly
increased their immigration-related lawmaking. Our prior statistical analysis
has shown that these laws are rarely driven by pressing demographic
problems and that local political contexts are better predictors of restrictive
action. Further, we have argued that the federal gridlock purportedly
compelling these state and local laws is not merely a “given.” Instead, it is
purposefully engineered by restrictive issue entrepreneurs who seek to
proliferate restrictionist legislation at the subfederal level. Thus, our new
theory of immigration regulation elegantly accounts for both federal
legislative stagnation and state and local policy proliferation.
This theory of Polarized Change, however, is only possible when we
search beyond purely legal and functional accounts of the rise of subfederal
immigration law. Importantly, we must understand the fundamental ways in
which the politics of immigration influence policy expression, subtly
shifting constitutional norms, and influencing judicial actors and scholarly
commentary. We believe this paper provides a necessary corrective to this
trend of apoliticized, demography-based evaluations of this rising
phenomenon. More significantly, by showing how these extra-constitutional
factors inherently affect legal appraisal of these phenomena, we hope that
courts, commentators, elected officials, media actors, and the general public
will modulate their responses based on this more accurate understanding.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Description of our City and State Data Sets
We start with a baseline of cities (defined as “places” in most states, but
also including “county subdivisions” in others). Next, we obtained lists of
cities that have proposed restrictive ordinances and regulations from various
sources, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Fair Immigration Reform
Movement, the National Immigration Law Center, and the Migration Policy
Institute. We then validated these lists by making phone calls to
jurisdictions noted as considering or passing ordinances, as well as by
monitoring news stories on local ordinances. The data on city ordinances
become far less reliable after 2007, with a sharp decline in newspaper
reports of new municipal ordinances and no further tracking of municipal
legislation by national advocacy groups.
We merged information on the proposal and passage of ordinances with
census data on various demographic factors. The census data are primarily
from 2000.
Finally, we came up with a measure of state-level legislative activity on
immigrant integration based on reports from the National Conference of
State Legislatures from 2005, 2006, and 2007, and we included any
measures that bear a significant relationship to illegal immigration. Two
graduate research assistants were instructed to code the bills an ordinal scale
of 1:“low impact” and 2:“high impact” on immigrant rights and/or access to
benefits, based on the provision’s likely effects on immigrant life chances
and the number of immigrants likely to be effected. Since these two
categories offered a stark distinction, inter-coder reliability was ninety-four
percent. In the cases where two codes conflicted, the principal investigator
(Ramakrishnan) provided the tie-breaking vote. Finally, when we use statelevel activity as a contextual variable in our municipal dataset, we use a net
total measure of such activity, given multiple laws passed in various states,
including a mix of permissive and restrictive ones.
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Appendix B. Multivariate Regression Analyses
Table B.1. Logit Regression Estimations of Municipal Ordinances
Proposal

Republican majority in
county

Percent naturalized in
population

Growth in immigrant
population, 2000-2007

Agriculture jobs (share)

Percent of immigrants
who are recent arrivals

Overcrowded households
(% of total)

White poverty rate

Black poverty rate

Population (ln)

Passage

Restrictive

Pro

Restrictive

Pro

0.967***

-1.406***

1.454***

-1.430***

[5.222]

[-8.675]

[9.942]

[-8.970]

-0.027

-0.037

0.01

-0.042

[-1.243]

[-1.968]

[0.612]

[-2.268]

0

-0.013***

0

-0.012***

[-0.481]

[-48.159]

[-0.885]

[-47.768]

-0.046

0.001

-0.183*

-0.001

[-2.896]

[0.086]

[-14.463]

[-0.039]

0.004

0.027***

0.01

0.027***

[1.356]

[9.385]

[3.955]

[9.578]

0.024

0.061*

0.037

0.068**

[0.810]

[2.409]

[1.606]

[2.717]

-0.009

0.038**

-0.02

0.036**

[-0.779]

[3.794]

[-2.191]

[3.652]

0.006

0.003

-0.003

0.003

[1.537]

[0.842]

[-1.214]

[1.011]

0.672***

1.426***

0.712***

1.412***

44:1431]

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL

State policy climate

Constant
Observations
Pseudo-R2
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[12.147]

[29.456]

[16.298]

[29.648]

0.025

0.001

0.032

-0.002

[0.980]

[0.061]

[1.630]

[-0.080]

-11.631** *

-19.717***

-12.893***

-19.579***

16,384

16,384

16,384

16,384

0.12

0.48

0.16

0.48

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on twosided tests. Significance (p) values in brackets
Note: Number of observations reduced because of missing data on nativity in cities
below 6,000 residents. Poverty rates from 2000 census because of missing data on
black poverty rates in an additional 7,176 cities.
Table B.2. Regression Estimations of Restrictive State Laws Enacted, 2005-2010
0.156**
Republican share of voters
[0.441]
-0.0536
Percent of immigrants who are recent arrivals
[-0.116]
0.0521
Growth of Latino population
[0.219]
0.139
White poverty
[0.113]
-0.0285
Black poverty
[-0.0605]
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-0.504*

Agriculture jobs (share of total)
[-0.391]
-4.28
Constant
[0.000760]
Observations
R-square

50
0.22

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on twosided tests. Significance (p) values in brackets.
Note: The dependent variable is no major laws, one major law, two or more major
laws.

